Comparative Constitutional Design

Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

This book is written for anyone, anywhere sitting down to write a constitution. The book is designed to be educative for even those not engaged directly in constitutional design but who would like to come to a better understanding of the nature and problems of constitutionalism and its fundamental building blocks - especially popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. Rather than a 'how-to-do-it' book that explains what to do in the sense of where one should end up, it instead explains where to begin - how to go about thinking about constitutions and constitutional design before sitting down to write anything. Still, it is possible, using the detailed indexes found in the book, to determine the level of popular sovereignty one has designed into a proposed constitution and how to balance it with an approximate, appropriate level of separation of powers to enhance long-term stability.

This landmark volume of specially commissioned, original contributions by top international scholars organizes the issues and controversies of the rich and rapidly maturing field of comparative constitutional law. Divided into sections on constitutional design and redesign, identity, structure, individual rights and state duties, courts and constitutional interpretation, this comprehensive volume covers over 100 countries as well as a range of approaches to the boundaries of constitutional law. While some chapters reference the text of legal instruments expressly labeled constitutional, others focus on the idea of entrenchment or take a more functional approach. Challenging the current boundaries of the field, the contributors offer diverse perspectives - cultural, historical and institutional - as well as suggestions for future research. A unique and enlightening volume, Comparative Constitutional Law is an essential resource for students and scholars of the subject.

ÔA fascinating collection of essays commenting on and developing FrankenbergÕs IKEA theory of legal transfer. With valuable theoretical analyses, comparative studies, attention to gender issues, post-colonial contexts, imposed law and legal history, this book is essential reading for anyone thinking about the circulation of legal models especially, but not only, in the area of constitutional law.Õ Ð David Nelken, University of Cardiff, UK ÔFrankenbergÕs work gives a new insight of what comparative law can be in the context of globalization, representing an outstanding achievement. His theory of ÒtransferÓ supersedes the metaphors of mainstream scholarship, displaying that constitutions are not mere ÒcommoditiesÓ or items to be assembled. The real matter is rather, which ÒmeaningsÓ are generated through transfer. In this way, beyond any usual flat version, we may perceive that any Òconstitutional relocationÓ exhibits a reappraisal of the whole world we live in.Õ Ð Pier Giueseppe Monateri, University of Turin, Italy Constitutional orders and legal regimes are established and changed through the importing and exporting of ideas and ideologies, norms, institutions and arguments. The contributions in this book discuss this assumption and address theoretical questions, methodological problems and political projects connected with the transfer of constitutions and law. Some of the chapters focus on the pathways, risks and side-effects of legal-constitutional transfers in specific situations, such as postcolonial societies and occupied territories. Others follow law beyond the official arenas into systems of legal pluralism, while others analyze how experimentalism generates hybrid constitutional orders. This interdisciplinary, multi-jurisdictional study will appeal to researchers, academics and advanced students in the fields of comparative constitutional law, comparative law and legal theory.

How should constitutional design respond to the opportunities and challenges raised by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences, and do so in ways that promote democracy, social justice, peace and stability? This is one of the most difficult questions facing societies in the world today. There are two schools of thought on how to answer this question. Under the heading of accommodation, some have argued for the need to recognize, institutionalize and empower differences. There are a range of constitutional instruments available to achieve this goal, such as multinational federalism and administrative decentralization, legal pluralism (e.g. religious personal law), other forms of non-territorial minority rights (e.g. minority language and religious education rights), consociationalism, affirmative action, legislative quotas, etc. But others have countered that such practices may entrench, perpetuate and exacerbate the very divisions they are designed to manage. They propose a range of alternative strategies that fall under the rubric of integration that will blur, transcend and cross-cut differences. Such strategies include bills of rights enshrining universal human rights enforced by judicial review, policies of disestablishment (religious and ethnocultural), federalism and electoral systems designed specifically to include members of different groups within the same political unit and to disperse members of the same group across different units, are some examples. In this volume, leading scholars of constitutional law, comparative politics and political theory address the debate at a conceptual level, as well as through numerous country case-studies, through an interdisciplinary lens, but with a legal and institutional focus.

Recent years have witnessed an explosion of new research on constitution making. Comparative Constitution Making provides an up-to-date overview of this rapidly expanding field. p.p1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 10.0px Arial}

After the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, it was semi-presidentialism--a rare model known more generally as the "French type." This constitutional model melded elements of pure presidentialism with those of pure parliamentarism. Specifically, semi-presidentialism combined a popularly elected head of state with a head of government responsible to a legislature. Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century--Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic--Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy. She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, Skach challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice. This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs.

Comparative constitutional change has recently emerged as a distinct field in the study of constitutional law. It is the study of the way constitutions change through formal and informal mechanisms, including amendment, replacement, total and partial revision, adaptation, interpretation, disuse and revolution. The shift of focus from constitution-making to constitutional change makes sense, since amendment power is the means used to refurbish constitutions in established democracies, enhance their adaptation capacity and boost their efficacy. Adversely, constitutional change is also the basic apparatus used to orchestrate constitutional backslide as the erosion of liberal democracies and democratic regression is increasingly affected through legal channels of constitutional change. Routledge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change provides a comprehensive reference tool for all those working in the field and a thorough landscape of all theoretical and practical aspects of the topic. Coherence from this aspect does not suggest a common view, as the chapters address different topics, but reinforces the establishment of comparative constitutional change as a distinct field. The book brings together the most respected scholars working in the field, and presents a genuine contribution to comparative constitutional studies, comparative public law, political science and constitutional history.