Common Defense Against Uncommon Threats

This work examines the current cyber space threat against the US, the current gaps in combating it, and how a US cyber militia might fill those gaps. Militias have historically been used by the US as an emergency measure to protect national security and to defend the homeland in lieu of a regular standing force. Currently, there are cyber militias being utilized worldwide to do just that, but along virtual borders vice land, sea, air and space. Countries such as Estonia and India have combated State and Non-State actors successfully with all-volunteer cyber militias performing an array of tasks in the common defense of their cyber domain. The research compares the organizational structure, mission, formative strategic context, and notable actions of six volunteer cyber organizations through a qualitative case study analysis. Coupled with an extensive literature review, this study examines possible implications of a US cyber militia on US cyberspace security. The focus of the conclusions and recommendations are on the short and long term impacts a cyber militia could have on US defense operations. Since their inception, the executive and legislative branches of the United States (US) have worked in concert to fend off various threats for the common defense of the country. The US is now facing perhaps one of the most complicated, persistent and technical threats in its history via the man-made domain known as Cyberspace. This threat is complex because it is constantly evolving, lacks attribution, is easily accessible, relatively cheap, and it is growing exponentially. As this threat develops, the resources required to defend against it have and will continue to grow unless the government can create more innovative defenses. Specifically, the amount of time, money, and personnel required to combat the escalating threats in cyberspace have increased exponentially in order for the US to keep its long held advantages in the other warfare domains. This dramatic investment by the US has seemingly kept pace with the threat, and currently shows no signs of slowing down. Assured access to the world's shared spaces has been a pillar of US national security strategy since 1782 through its "free ship, free space" policy concerning navigation of the seas. The US has followed a similar policy in terms of assured access to cyberspace but there are unique and numerous issues that policymakers must understand to achieve this end state. These issues include competing funding priorities, a shortage in cyber security personnel, and a legislative system designed for rigor and not necessarily speed. However, the greatest issue is the nature of the threat itself. It is complex, uncertain, growing and affects anyone using a network. Public and private entities share varying degrees of vulnerabilities and the DoD is no different. There is an ever-increasing demand for weapon systems reliant upon cyber connectivity, a growing number of provocateurs with access to powerful viruses, and the fact remains that despite the increase in the complexity of defensive measures, there has not been a corresponding decrease in cyber-attacks. Additionally, current efforts to deter or coerce belligerents from performing cyber-attacks through political or economic sanctions will continue to remain ineffective until the anonymity provided by mostly open systems architecture is solved.

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This work examines the current cyber space threat against the US, the current gaps in combating it, and how a US cyber militia might fill those gaps. Militias have historically been used by the US as an emergency measure to protect national security and to defend the homeland in lieu of a regular standing force. Currently, there are cyber militias being utilized worldwide to do just that, but along virtual borders vice land, sea, air and space. Countries such as Estonia and India have combated State and Non-State actors successfully with all-volunteer cyber militias performing an array of tasks in the common defense of their cyber domain. The research compares the organizational structure, mission, formative strategic context, and notable actions of six volunteer cyber organizations through a qualitative case study analysis. Coupled with an extensive literature review, this study examines possible implications of a US cyber militia on US cyberspace security. The focus of the conclusions and recommendations are on the short and long term impacts a cyber militia could have on US defense operations.Since their inception, the executive and legislative branches of the United States (US) have worked in concert to fend off various threats for the common defense of the country. The US is now facing perhaps one of the most complicated, persistent and technical threats in its history via the man-made domain known as Cyberspace. This threat is complex because it is constantly evolving, lacks attribution, is easily accessible, relatively cheap, and it is growing exponentially. As this threat develops, the resources required to defend against it have and will continue to grow unless the government can create more innovative defenses. Specifically, the amount of time, money, and personnel required to combat the escalating threats in cyberspace have increased exponentially in order for the US to keep its long held advantages in the other warfare domains. This dramatic investment by the US has seemingly kept pace with the threat, and currently shows no signs of slowing down.Assured access to the world's shared spaces has been a pillar of US national security strategy since 1782 through its "free ship, free space" policy concerning navigation of the seas. The US has followed a similar policy in terms of assured access to cyberspace but there are unique and numerous issues that policymakers must understand to achieve this end state. These issues include competing funding priorities, a shortage in cyber security personnel, and a legislative system designed for rigor and not necessarily speed. However, the greatest issue is the nature of the threat itself. It is complex, uncertain, growing and affects anyone using a network. Public and private entities share varying degrees of vulnerabilities and the DoD is no different. There is an ever-increasing demand for weapon systems reliant upon cyber connectivity, a growing number of provocateurs with access to powerful viruses, and the fact remains that despite the increase in the complexity of defensive measures, there has not been a corresponding decrease in cyber-attacks. Additionally, current efforts to deter or coerce belligerents from performing cyber-attacks through political or economic sanctions will continue to remain ineffective until the anonymity provided by mostly open systems architecture is solved.

The United States faces the realistic and indefinite threat of terrorist attack with nuclear weapons. Whether the United States is successful in preventing such an attack will depend on whether we effectively wield the instruments of security. It will also depend on whether we effectively manage national security processes and apply the law in a manner that both enhances security and upholds our core values. As a result, lawyers, not just presidents, generals, and spies, will decide the outcome of this conflict. This book, first published in 2007, is essential for anyone wanting an understanding of national security law and process. The book includes chapters on constitutional law, the use of force, and homeland security, presented in the context of today's threats and as applied to issues like rendition and electronic surveillance.