Coal Mining Safety In The Progressive Period

Through the first decade of the twentieth century, Americans looked upon industrial accidents with callous disregard; they were accepted as an unfortunate but necessary adjunct to industrial society. A series of mine disasters in December 1907 (including one in Monongah, West Virginia, which took a toll of 361 lives) shook the public, at least temporarily, out of its lethargy. In this award-winning study, author William Graebner traces the development of mine safety reform in the years immediately following these tragic events. Reform activities during the Progressive period centered on the Bureau of Mines and an effort to obtain uniform state legislation; the effect of each was minimal. Mr. Graebner concludes that these idealistic solutions of the time were at once the great hope and the great failure of the Progressive coal-mining safety movement.

Considers S. 355 and related S. 467, S. 1094, S. 1178, S. 1300, and S. 1907, to strengthen Federal coal mining health and safety regulations.

In To Punish or Persuade, John Braithwaite declares that coal mine disasters are usually the result of corporate crime. He surveys 39 coal mine disasters from around the world, including 19 in the United States since 1960, and concludes that mine fatalities are usually not caused by human error or the unstoppable forces of nature. He shows that a combination of punitive and educative measures taken against offenders can have substantial effects in reducing injuries to miners. Braithwaite not only develops a model for determining the optimal mix of punishment and persuasion to maximize mine safety, but provides regulatory agencies in general with a model for mixing the two strategies to ensure compliance with the law. To Punish or Persuade looks at coal mine safety in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, France, Belgium, and Japan. It examines closely the five American coal mining companies with the best safety performance in the industry: U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Consolidation Coal Company, Island Creek Coal Company, and Old Ben Coal Company. It also takes a look at the safety record of unionized versus non-unionized mines and how safety regulation enforcement impacts productivity.

My dissertation focuses on coal mining and occupational health and safety in the United States from 1968 to 1985. In the late 1960s, coal miners faced the constant risk of injury, occupational disease, and death. The dangerous conditions in the coal industry resulted in a massive explosion at the Farmington mine in West Virginia in 1968, which killed 78 miners. The Farmington disaster spurred miners to campaign for the reform of state and federal coal mine health and safety laws in the United States. They rejected the national leadership of their union, the United Mine Workers (UMW), which they perceived as corrupt and inattentive to their concerns. Instead, they engaged in activism at the local level, with the support of their families, activists, liberal politicians, and progressive physicians. They sought improved preventative legislation and compensation for the victims of pneumoconiosis, or 'black lung,' a debilitating, work-related respiratory disease.

From the 1880s to the 1980s more than eight thousand workers died in the coal mines of the Rocky Mountain states. Sometimes they died by the dozens in fiery explosions, but more often they died alone, crushed by collapsing roofs or runaway mine cars. Many old-timers in coal-mining communities and even some historians haveøblamed the high fatality rate on ruthless coal barons exploiting miners in the single-minded pursuit of profit. The coal industry preferred to blame careless miners. James Whiteside looks beyond those charges in seeking to explain why the western coal mines were (and, to some degree, still are) dangerous and why territorial, state, and federal laws failed for so long to make them safer. Regulating Danger is the first extended study of the coal-mining industry in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and Montana. It exceeds the scope of traditional labor history in focusing on working conditions and the problems of workers instead of unions and strikes. After examining the inherent physical dangers of the work, Whiteside shows how the interplay of economic, social, and technological forces created an envi-ronment of death in the western coal mines. He goes on to discuss evolving industrial and political attitudes toward issues of responsibility for mine safety and government regulation and the fundamental changes in the industry that brought about safer working conditions.

Leading scholars from across the social sciences present empirical evidence that the obstacle of regulatory capture is more surmountable than previously thought.