Chinas Strategic Arsenal

"This volume brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to provide a fresh assessment of China's strategic military capabilities, doctrines, and perceptions in light of rapidly advancing technologies, an expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, and increased great-power competition with the United States. China's strategic weapons are its expanding nuclear arsenal and emerging conventional weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite missiles. China's strategic arsenal is important because of how it affects the dynamics of US-China relations and the relationship between China and its neighbors. Without a doubt China's strategic arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, but this book also examines key uncertainties. Will China's new capabilities and confidence lead it to be more assertive or take more risks? Will China's nuclear traditions (i.e., no first use) change as the strategic balance improves? Will China's approach to military competition in the domains of cyberspace and outer space be guided by a notion of strategic stability or not? Will there be a strategic arms race with the United States? The goal of this book is to update our understanding of these issues and to make predictions about how these dynamics may play out"--

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967. Tests continued until 1996 when China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret. There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. China is estimated by the Federation of American Scientists to have an arsenal of about 260 total warheads as of 2015, which would make it the second smallest nuclear arsenal amongst the five nuclear weapon states acknowledged by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to some estimates, the country could "more than double" the "number of warheads on missiles that could threaten the United States by the mid-2020s" Early in 2011, China published a defense white paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge. Yet China has yet to define what it means by a "minimum deterrent posture". This, together with the fact that "it is deploying four new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles invites concern as to the scale and intention of China's nuclear upgrade".

The United States, Russia and Great Britain have retired all nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Surprisingly, China has not. China seems to value highly tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Most studies of China's nuclear arsenal focus on strategic nuclear weapons. This focus could mislead those trying to understand PRC TNW strategy. The purpose of this thesis is to explain China's TNW development. China's nuclear arsenal evolution can be described in three phases. In the first phase, China developed a limited strategic nuclear deterrent. China's arsenal was driven by threat. Technology supplanted threat as the dominant driver during the next phase. While conducting research to miniaturize strategic warheads, TNWs were developed. During the third phase, a reduced threat caused political leaders to restrain the nuclear program. The nuclear program reverted to its primary objective -- building strategic weapons, causing TNW production to level off. This study explains the last two phases of TNW development. The research goals are twofold: to compare threat and technology, the primary motivations driving TNW production; and to examine the relationship between doctrine and development, describing how one influences the other. The conclusion offers U.S. foreign policy recommendations.

China�s nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. The arsenal has historically been small, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert, and married to a no-first-use doctrine � all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong�s oft-quoted remark that �nuclear weapons are a paper tiger� seems to be bluster or madness. China�s nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world�s most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China�s nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

China’s approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first test in 1964, but it has recently accelerated nuclear force modernization. China’s strategic environment is likely to grow more complex, and nuclear constituencies are gaining a larger bureaucratic voice. Beijing is unlikely to change official nuclear policies but will probably increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence and may adjust the definition of key concepts.

Conventional wisdom portrays the People's Republic of China (PRC) People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a backward continental force that will not pose a military challenge to its neighbors or to the United States well into the 21st century. PLA writings that demonstrate interest in exploiting the revolution in military affairs (RMA) are dismissed by a large segment of the PLA- watching community as wistful fantasies. The author offers an alternative perspective by outlining emerging PLA operational concepts and a range of research and development projects that appear to have been heavily influenced by U.S. and Russian writings on the RMA. Fulfillment of the PLA's vision for the 21st century could have significant repercussions for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.

The authors then elaborate a preliminary agenda for exploring with China the requirements of strategic stability in the emerging era and of testing Beijing's intention to continue some form of restraint in the years ahead."--BOOK JACKET.

In late 2015, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) initiated reforms that have brought dramatic changes to its structure, model of warfighting, and organizational culture, including the creation of a Strategic Support Force (SSF) that centralizes most PLA space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities. The reforms come at an inflection point as the PLA seeks to pivot from land-based territorial defense to extended power projection to protect Chinese interests in the "strategic frontiers" of space, cyberspace, and the far seas. Understanding the new strategic roles of the SSF is essential to understanding how the PLA plans to fight and win informationized wars and how it will conduct information operations.

Using major new documentary sources, the authors tell the story of why and how China built its nuclear submarine flotilla and the impact of that development on the nation's politics, technology, industry, and strategy.