Capital Taxation

Taxation—both corporate and personal—has been held responsible for the low investment and productivity growth rates experienced in the West during the last decade. This book, a comparative study of the taxation of income from capital in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and West Germany, establishes for the first time a common framework for analysis that permits accurate comparison of tax systems.

This important contribution to tax analysis presents seven related theoretical essays that examine the effects of capital income taxation on the behavior of firms. It is divided into three sections, focusing on optimal tax design, firm financial policy, and inflation. Taken together, the essays demonstrate the powerful role taxes play in shaping the behavior of American corporations, and also provide insights into the difficult task of tax reform. Auerbach's results suggest policies the government might adopt to promote the optimal accumulation of capital. He examines the implications for capital taxation of discrepancies between nominal depreciation rates and real economic depreciation, and suggests appropriate rules of thumb for determining when capital taxation is neutral among alternative investment projects. He also makes important contributions to the debate over the integration of corporate and personal taxes on capital income and to the behavioral puzzle of why corporations pay dividends to their shareholders.

Feldstein shows how systems of taxation influence the rate and nature of capital formation--key to the development of any economy. His identification of important economic and policy questions, adroit use of modeling and new data, and careful attention to dynamics make this book a powerful addition to the literature.

Rich people stash away trillions of dollars in tax havens like Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, or Singapore. Multinational corporations shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland or Panama to avoid paying tax. Recent stories in the media about Apple, Google, Starbucks, and Fiat are just the tip of the iceberg. There is hardly any multinational today that respects not just the letter but also the spirit of tax laws. All this becomes possible due to tax competition, with countries strategically designing fiscal policy to attract capital from abroad. The loopholes in national tax regimes that tax competition generates and exploits draw into question political economic life as we presently know it. They undermine the fiscal autonomy of political communities and contribute to rising inequalities in income and wealth. Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, this book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in degrees. Moreover, the strategic tax setting of states should be limited in important ways. An International Tax Organisation (ITO) should be created to enforce the principles of tax justice. The author defends this call for reform against two important objections. First, Dietsch refutes the suggestion that regulating tax competition is inefficient. Second, he argues that regulation of this sort, rather than representing a constraint on national sovereignty, in fact turns out to be a requirement of sovereignty in a global economy. The book closes with a series of reflections on the obligations that the beneficiaries of tax competition have towards the losers both prior to any institutional reform as well as in its aftermath.

How should capital income be taxed to achieve efficiency and equity? In this detailed study, tax policy analyst Jane Gravelle, brings together comprehensive estimates of effective tax rates on a wide variety of capital by type, industry, legal form, method of financing, and across time. These estimates are combined with a history and survey of issues regarding capital income taxation that are aimed especially at bringing the findings of economic theory and recent empirical research to nonspecialists and policymakers. Many of the topics treated have been the subject of policy debate and legislation over the last ten or fifteen years.Should capital income be taxed at all? And, if capital income is to be taxed, what is the best way to do it? Gravelle devotes two chapters to the first question, and then, in answer to the second question, covers a broad range of topics - corporate taxation, tax neutrality, capital gains taxes, tax treatment of retirement savings, and capital income taxation and international competitiveness. Gravelle also includes a comprehensive history of tax institutions and data on constructing effective tax rates that are not available elsewhere.

Inflation, Tax Rules, and Capital Formation brings together fourteen papers that show the importance of the interaction between tax rules and monetary policy. Based on theoretical and empirical research, these papers emphasize the importance of including explicit specifications of the tax system in such study.

This report investigates policy considerations in the taxation of capital gains of individuals and design features of capital gains tax systems.

Wage inequality has been significantly higher in the United States than in continental European countries (CEU) since the 1970s. Moreover, this inequality gap has further widened during this period as the US has experienced a large increase in wage inequality, whereas the CEU has seen only modest changes. This paper studies the role of labor income tax policies for understanding these facts, focusing on male workers. We construct a life cycle model in which individuals decide each period whether to go to school, work, or stay non-employed. Individuals can accumulate skills either in school or while working. Wage inequality arises from differences across individuals in their ability to learn new skills as well as from idiosyncratic shocks. Progressive taxation compresses the (after-tax) wage structure, thereby distorting the incentives to accumulate human capital, in turn reducing the cross-sectional dispersion of (before-tax) wages. Consistent with the model, we empirically document that countries with more progressive labor income tax schedules have (i) significantly lower before-tax wage inequality at different points in time and (ii) experienced a smaller rise in wage inequality since the early 1980s. We then study the calibrated model and find that these policies can account for half of the difference between the US and the CEU in overall wage inequality and 84% of the difference in inequality at the upper end (log 90-50 differential). In a two-country comparison between the US and Germany, the combination of skill-biased technical change and changing progressivity of tax schedules explains all the difference between the evolution of inequality in these two countries since the early 1980s.

A complete, authoritative guide to taxation of stocks, mutual funds and market-traded stock options.

The question of whether to tax income from wealth has sparked debate since our country's inception. Does taxing capital income ensure the progressivity of our system or merely discourage saving? Would switching our tax code to one that taxes only consumption be more efficient or only burden middle- and low-income people? And if we were to radically reform the way America taxes its citizens, how could we ensure that vital revenue would not be lost? Some analysts would even argue that, under our present byzantine tax system, we don't really tax capital income at all. In this volume, eminent economists analyze the problems associated with taxing capital income and propose policy solutions, which are then challenged by their peers in informed commentary. It may not settle the debate, but policymakers, scholars, and the public will find a wealth of information and ideas to consider.