Capital Flow Deflection

This paper focuses on the coordination problem among borrowing countries imposing controls on capital infl ows. In a simple model of capital flows and controls, we show that inflow restrictions distort international capital flows to other countries and that, in turn, such capital flow deflection may lead to a policy response. We then test the theory using data on inflow restrictions and gross capital inflows for a large sample of developing countries between 1995 and 2009. Our estimation yields strong evidence that capital controls deflect capital flows to other borrowing countries with similar economic characteristics. Notwithstanding these strong cross-border spillover effects, we do not find evidence of a policy response.

This paper focuses on the coordination problem among borrowing countries imposing controls on capital infl ows. In a simple model of capital flows and controls, we show that inflow restrictions distort international capital flows to other countries and that, in turn, such capital flow deflection may lead to a policy response. We then test the theory using data on inflow restrictions and gross capital inflows for a large sample of developing countries between 1995 and 2009. Our estimation yields strong evidence that capital controls deflect capital flows to other borrowing countries with similar economic characteristics. Notwithstanding these strong cross-border spillover effects, we do not find evidence of a policy response.

This dissertation comprises four main chapters that examine issues surrounding capital flows and capital controls. Chapter 1 outlines the dissertation. Chapter 2 discusses several key themes in the literature on capital flows and capital controls. First, I discuss and compare the measures of capital flows and how they are commonly used. I show that net capital flows provide relevant information on investment-saving decisions. However, net capital flows may provide a false sense of security. Gross flows, on the other hand, provide information that is more relevant to financial stability. Second, I summarize various risks associated with capital flows into two broad categories and relate them to policy objectives against which the efficacy of capital controls is evaluated. I show that various macroeconomic risks associated with capital flows could be broadly grouped into (1) loss of export competitiveness and (2) increased financial instability. In terms of policy objectives, the main policy objectives are whether capital controls are able to (1) reduce real exchange market pressures, and (2) allow for a more independent monetary policy, (3) reduce the volume of capital flows, (4) alter the compositions of capital flows toward longer-maturity flows, and (5) reduce the frequency of disruptive adjustments such as currency crises and severe output loss. Third, I compare the framework used to document capital controls to the framework used to document capital flows. In doing so, I draw the de jure connections between measures of capital flows and measures of capital controls. Not only do the connections help one classify capital controls, but they also identify the exact types of capital flows that various types of capital controls intend to regulate. Fourth, I discuss major capital control indices in terms of the main considerations that are commonly involved to construct these indices, including (1) what to measure, (2) what asset categories to cover, (3) what data sources to use, and (4) what coding algorithms and weighting schemes to use to convert raw data to composite indices. Fifth, I compare and contrast major publicly-available capital control indices both at the world level and at a country level for selected countries (Brazil and South Korea). Finally, I synthesize studies on the effectiveness of capital controls and summarize possible factors that may have contributed to the inconclusiveness of the results from the existing studies. By surveying the literature, I find that possible factors include difficulties in (1) measuring capital controls, (2) obtaining capital flow data with high frequency, (3) standardizing the scope of capital flows, (4) addressing the selection bias problem, and (5) controlling for circumvention of capital controls and institutional quality. Chapter 3 examines whether countries with capital controls are less likely to experience capital surges and capital stops. I use a propensity score matching method to address the issue of selection bias, which arises when observations with capital controls have distinct characteristics that influence both the probability of imposing capital controls and the probability of experiencing capital surges and stops. These distinct characteristics, when not properly controlled for, can give rise to a biased estimate of the effect of capital controls. I use a propensity score matching method on a large data set of country-time observations. The data set encompasses both developed and developing countries and covers the period 1995-2016. The results of Chapter 3 show that capital controls may be effective, but only for observations that have not imposed capital controls. In addition, only capital controls that involve the use of inflow controls appear to be effective. Chapter 4 addresses why some episodes of gross inflow surges ended in financial crises. Using a common set of 53 countries that include both advanced and emerging countries, I show that both global factors (such as investors' risk aversion) and domestic factors (such as domestic credit growth, foreign exchange reserves, institutional quality, and capital controls) play roles in explaining the endings of surge episodes. The effect of capital controls depends on a country's institutional quality. For countries with lower institutional quality, imposing capital controls does not decrease the probability of hard landing. Capital controls only start to contribute to a lower probability of hard landings when the institutional quality of a country is above a threshold. Chapter 5 examines the spillover effects of foreign-implemented capital controls. I propose-from a domestic country's perspective-that foreign-implemented capital controls can affect domestic capital flows in the flowing ways. First, foreign-implemented inflow controls may reduce domestic outflows going into these foreign countries, due to the bilateral linkages between these foreign countries and the domestic country (the domestic-outflow-reduction hypothesis). Second, foreign-implemented outflow controls may reduce the domestic inflows from these foreign countries, again due to the bilateral linkages between these foreign countries and the domestic country (hereafter, the domestic-inflow-reduction hypothesis). Third, foreign-implemented inflow controls may deflect capital flows-originally going to these foreign countries-to the domestic country (hereafter, the deflection hypothesis). The findings of this chapter support the existence of spillover effects. For the three hypotheses, I find that tightening of foreign-implemented inflow controls-measured by increases in trade-weighted and geographic-proximity-weighted inflow control indices of other countries in the rest of the world-reduces domestic outflows, while tightening of foreign-implemented outflow controls-measured by increases in trade-weighted and geographic-proximity-weighted outflow control indices of other countries in the rest of the world-reduces domestic inflows. In addition, tightening of inflow controls implemented in foreign countries-measured by finance-weighted capital control indices of other countries in the rest of the world-divert capital inflows away from the domestic country. The results suggest that foreign-implemented capital controls have signaling effects on domestic capital flows via common lenders. When one country implements inflow capital controls, the policy actions prompt the common lenders to perceive that other countries with similar borrowing patterns are likely to become less supportive of foreign investment. As such, global investors retreat their investment, leading to reductions in domestic inflows.

Capital flow volatility is a concern for macroeconomic and financial stability. Nonetheless, literature is scarce in this topic. Our paper sheds light on this issue in two dimensions. First, using quarterly data for 65 countries over the period 1970Q1-2016Q1, we construct three measures of volatility, for total capital flows and key instruments. Second, we perform panel regressions to understand the determinants of volatility. The measures show that the volatility of all instruments is prone to bouts, rising sharply during global shocks like the taper tantrum episode. Capital flow volatility thus remains a challenge for policy makers. The regression results suggest that push factors can be more important than pull factors in explaining volatility, illustrating that the characteristics of volatility can be different from those of the flows levels.

The volatility of capital flows to emerging markets continues to pose challenges to policymakers. In this paper, we propose a new framework to answer critical policy questions: What policies and policy frameworks are most effective in dampening sharp capital flow movements in response to global shocks? What are the near- versus medium-term trade-offs of different policies? We tackle these questions using a quantile regression framework to predict the entire future probability distribution of capital flows to emerging markets, based on current domestic structural characteristics, policies, and global financial conditions. This new approach allows policymakers to quantify capital flows risks and evaluate policy tools to mitigate them, thus building the foundation of a risk management framework for capital flows.

This paper documents the evolution of gross and net capital flows to emerging market economies and surveys the large literature on the potential drivers. While the capital flow landscape has been shaped by the evolution of both global and country-specific factors, the relative importance of these factors has varied over time and differs depending on the type of capital flows. The findings from the survey of the literature thus underscores the importance of policies in both source and recipient countries in shaping capital flows.

This paper reviews the causes, consequences, and policy responses to large capital flows in several emerging markets. It opens by studying recent patterns of capital flows, and then discusses the causes of capital flows. Emphasis is given to the reasons behind the capital inflow episode in the 1990s, the major reversals, and the volatility observed in these flows. The paper goes on to examine the consequences of capital inflows and the pros and cons of alternative policy responses. It concludes with policy lessons derived from country experiences.

Using a sample of 34 emerging markets and developing economies over the period 2009Q3-2015Q4, the paper employs a panel framework to study the determinants of capital flows, both net and gross, across a wide range of instruments. The baseline regressions are then extended to focus on high and low episodes – quarters with flows one standard deviation above/below mean. Overall, the results suggest that the capital flow slowdown witnessed in recent years is due to a combination of lower growth prospects of recipient countries and worse global risk sentiment. However, the determinants of flows can be considerably different across instruments and across the type of flows considered, net or gross. The sensitivity of certain types of flows, towards push and pull factors, increases during periods of high and low capital flows. Moreover, some variables may not necessarily be significant during normal times, but can be important drivers during such episodes, and vice versa. Indicators like the gap between the U.S. long- and short-term maturity bond yields – not significant during normal times – can be an important driver during high episodes.

This study quantifies the importance of a Global Financial Cycle (GFCy) for capital flows. We use capital flow data dis-aggregated by direction and type between 1990Q1 and 2015Q5 for 85 countries, and conventional techniques, models and metrics. Since the GFCy is an unobservable concept, we use two methods to represent it: directly observable variables in center economies often linked to it, such as the VIX; and indirect manifestations, proxied by common dynamic factors extracted from actual capital flows. Our evidence seems mostly inconsistent with a significant and conspicuous GFCy; both methods combined rarely explain more than a quarter of the variation in capital flows. Succinctly, most variation in capital flows does not seem to be the result of common shocks nor stem from observables in a central country like the United States.