Burden Sharing Strategy And The Design Of Nato

Burden sharing is back. Indeed many observers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance would claim that it never went away. This is because, from its inception in 1949, NATO has never been an alliance of equals. The United States has always made the overwhelmingly larger contribution, not only for the defense of Europe under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, but also in the numerous operations that the Alliance has carried out beyond Europe since the end of the Cold War. At one stage in the late-1950s, the United States had nearly 400,000 troops and 7,000 nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe. It also maintained large stocks of pre-positioned equipment and sent thousands of more troops back to Europe every year for reinforcement and exercises.

This book, first published in 1983, analyses the debate around burden-sharing in NATO, where the main issue is the distribution amongst the allies of the burden of maintaining the security arrangement. This raises problems of defining, measuring and comparing the defence efforts of the various countries. This book examines the issues, and argues for the need to address directly the fundamental problems concerning the Cold War security relationship between the United States and Western Europe.

The allocation of burdens and responsibilities within NATO has been a contentious issue since the formation of the alliance. This report explores the reasons that European defense spending is proportionately less than that of the United States, and contrasts the European spending record with their more impressive record in supplying defense resources to the Atlantic Alliance. The analysis makes clear that there are no simple quantitative criteria for assessing burden-sharing performance. Changing perceptions of the Soviet threat, and the forthcoming 1992 change in the European Economic Community, complicate the burden-sharing issue. Burden-sharing must be addressed together with needed changes in NATO military strategy and doctrine, and in light of the new political challenge for NATO governments posed by the Soviet Union's new style of security diplomacy. A clearer consensus within NATO on a future force structure and military doctrine is essential for acceptable future burden-sharing arrangements.

War, as Clausewitz reminds, is the most uncertain of human political and social activities. It also imposes burdens. In an alliance among states for the promotion of collective defense or security, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), burdens have to be shared. This study looks at the experience of the United States and other member states of NATO in four situations of multinational military intervention - Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and South Asia - and considers the implications of nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation for the US and NATO. Each case study represents an important period in the distribution of power, interest, and values, amounting to more than a sequential consideration of incidents of military intervention and/or conflict prevention. These politico-military challenges include a major coalition war, a traditional peacekeeping operation, an exercise in peace enforcement, and a conflict that combines counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism with stability and security operations.

This book states that burden-sharing is one of the most persisting sources for tension and disagreement within NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). It also belongs to one of the most studied issues within NATO with distinguishable traditions and schools of thought. However, this pertinent question has been rarely discussed extensively by academics. The key idea of the book is to make burden-sharing more understandable as a historical, contemporary and future phenomenon. The authors take a comprehensive look at what is actually meant with burden-sharing and how it has evolved as a concept and a real-life phenomenon through the 70 years of NATO’s existence.

Viewing the behavior of NATO members through the prism of bargaining theory reveals them as states intent on obtaining the benefits of membership at the least cost to themselves. This book shows how NATO members use a variety of strategies and tactics to try to get the better of each other without wrecking an alliance that realizes their shared goals and from which they all benefit. The book examines: the original design of the alliance; patterns of bargaining during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods; how their rivalries impact members' domestic policies of defense and welfare; and what this history suggests about NATO's future prospects. Recent interventions in the Balkans and the Middle East make this virtually a playbook for following current events.