Building Special Operations Partnerships In Afghanistan And Beyond

This report summarizes key special operations forces (SOF) partnering practices and presents findings from case studies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia. It also identifies best practices to benefit development of SOF in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Relationships empower Special Operations Forces (SOF) to perform as a highly skilled and reliable cadre in collaboration with local partner forces to prevent and solve shared problem sets, often accomplishing more with less. Since 9/11, however, relationships between SOF and their partners have not always been properly built and maintained. The authors trace the causal effects of constraints, trainings, and incentives and their impact on the current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF approach of building enduring relationships. Motivated by numerous deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with recurring problem sets, we chose to conduct a struc-tured-focused comparison between U.S. and Danish SOF supporting Operation Inherent Resolve in Al Anbar, Iraq (2015-2018) and German SOF during the shift of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan (2013-2015). The analysis of these cases finds that specific interactions of the studied factors not only cause variations in relationships between SOF and partner forces, but ultimately influence operations and objectives determining mission success or failure. With further testing of our analysis and recommendations, this research can help to identify inherently flexible and nested strategic options for SOF senior leaders, allowing them to deploy SOF elements efficiently during times of asymmetric, diffuse, and episodic conflicts. Gojowsky and Koegler have written a fascinating and important manuscript concerning the use and lessons-learned of SOF in recent asymmetrical conflicts. In doing so, the authors systematically assess modern SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and relationships between NATO SOF and their local partners. This is a must-read for those interested in the future of SOF as well as counter-insurgencies' future TTPs, constraints and incentives. Gojowsky and Koegler recommendations should be carefully considered by NATO and its member countries. Professor Thomas H. Johnson, Author of "Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict", Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

Identifies best practices for Special Operations Advisory Groups, which are tasked with advising headquarter elements of the Afghan Special Security Forces.

In 2010, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in Afghanistan began a new and innovative program to fight the Taliban insurgency using the movement's structure and strategy against it. The Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police initiative consisted of U.S. Army Special Forces and U.S. Navy SEAL teams embedding with villagers to fight the Taliban holistically. By enlisting Afghans in their own defense, organizing the local populace, and addressing their grievances with the Afghan government, SOF was able to defeat the Taliban’s military as well as its political arm. Combining the traditions of U.S. Army Special Forces with the lessons learned in the broader SOF community from years of counterinsurgency work in Iraq and Afghanistan, this new approach fundamentally changed the terms of the conflict with the Taliban. However, little has been written about this initiative outside of the special operations community until now. In this first-hand account of how the Village Stability Operations program functioned, Daniel R. Green provides a long-term perspective on how SOF stabilized the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan, the site of the Pashtun uprising against the Taliban in 2001 led by Hamid Karzai, future president of Afghanistan. In the Warlords’ Shadow offers a comprehensive overview of how SOF adapted to the unique demands of the local insurgency and is a rare, inside look at how special operations confronted the Taliban by fighting a “better war” and in so doing fundamentally changed the course of the war in Afghanistan.

This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war

The purpose of this monograph is to offer some practical solutions to building unity of effort between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces using operations in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2009 as a case study. In researching U.S. legal code and U.S. Armed Forces doctrine, it is clear that both the U.S. Congress and the various services intended all forces to work together towards a common end during operations. In the case of Afghanistan, it is apparent that three things complicated unity of effort between SOF and conventional forces: the lack of an Afghanistan campaign plan by USCENTCOM, the assignment of SOF under the operational control of the conventional force Joint Task Force from 2002 until 2006, and the difficulties of a transition to a NATO command structure in 2006. These complications affected both the activities on the battlefield and the synchronization of operational and strategic plans. This led to problems that included an atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding, support issues, conventional forces struggling to command and control SOF, unneeded restrictions on SOF, and personality conflicts that affected operations and synchronization. Several different possible solutions to improve unity of effort exist. They are: changing the command and control structure between SOF and conventional forces, nesting SOF operations and plans with the overall campaign plan, attempting to align the proper personalities with certain tasks and positions, educating and integrating SOF and conventional forces, aligning and empowering liaison officers more appropriately, and aligning SOF headquarters with conventional force headquarters as appropriate. The conclusion is that there are three imperatives to ensuring unity of effort between SOF and conventional forces. The first is to ensure that SOF operations and plans are nested with the overall theater campaign plan and if there is no overall theater campaign plan that SOF take the lead in its development. The second imperative is to use liaison officers that are the commander's representative and are value-added to the headquarters they liaise with. The third imperative is to ensure a command and control relationship between SOF and conventional forces which is flexible, allowing for the most robust support SOF can provide, while at the same time ensuring that forces are not working at cross-purposes. A more long-term and multi-faceted imperative that will take institutional change is that of the education of SOF and conventional forces about their respective branches, as well as prioritizing the integration of these forces during training and operations. Lastly, matching up personalities to staff positions wherein conventional forces and SOF interaction is high, as well as aligning SOF and conventional forces headquarters where appropriate are also areas in which unity of effort can be increased.

How do US special operations forces maximize their role in the foreign policy of "building partner capacity" (BPC) to support the objectives of national security strategy? Most analytical writing about partner force development focuses on the wartime advise-and-assist experience of both conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF). Few scholars have written about the nature of warfare in phase 0 or the strategic utility of special operations campaigns to develop capable and competent forces for partner nations. Fewer still have studied the comprehensive integration of SOF and CF to achieve the policy goals associated with building partner capacity. This monograph identifies gaps in the progression of history, theory, and doctrine for partner force advising and for phase 0 operations in general that contribute to differing cultural attitudes towards these mission and environments between SOF and CF. SOF are proven highly effective in building partner capacity with minimal CF integration, but only when certain criteria are present. When environments are suboptimal, there is insufficient evidence to suggest how these forces might campaign together to complement each other's capabilities and build partner capacity more effectively. US national security policy states that countering the global terrorist network which threatens US and allied interests requires support via an indirect approach through and with the military capacity of our partner nations. Threat groups based in weak and failed states uniformly exploit the undergoverned spaces where US partner nations lack the capacity to deny those spaces to the terrorist or insurgent. US security policy ends therefore include both defeating the terrorist network and supporting partner nation stability. The policy of building partner capacity is the way to achieve those ends, through whole-of-government actions to improve the security, development, and governance abilities of the partner nation. All services of the US military are tasked with preparing for and conducting stability operations, including the partner force development aspects of BPC. Special operations forces will find themselves involved in or leading nearly all these efforts, and must integrate with all capable and potential partners to most effectively support US strategic and policy goals.

A vital text for understanding the twenty-first-century battlefield and the shifting force structure, this book prepares students to think critically about the rapidly changing world they'll inherit. American Defense Policy, first published in 1965 under the leadership of Brent Scowcroft, has been a mainstay in courses on political science, international relations, military affairs, and American national security for more than 50 years. This updated and thoroughly revised ninth edition, which contains about 30% all-new content, considers questions of continuity and change in America's defense policy in the face of a global climate beset by geopolitical tensions, rapid technological change, and terrorist violence. The book is organized into three parts. Part I examines the theories and strategies that shape America's approach to security policy. Part II dives inside the defense policy process, exploring the evolution of contemporary civil-military relations, the changing character of the profession of arms, and the issues and debates in the budgeting, organizing, and equipping process. Part III examines how purpose and process translate into American defense policy. This invaluable and prudent text remains a classic introduction to the vital security issues the United States has faced throughout its history. It breaks new ground as a thoughtful and comprehensive starting point to understand American defense policy and its role in the world today. Contributors: Gordon Adams, John R. Allen, Will Atkins, Deborah D. Avant, Michael Barnett, Sally Baron, Jeff J.S. Black, Jessica Blankshain, Hal Brands, Ben Buchanan, Dale C. Copeland, Everett Carl Dolman, Jeffrey Donnithorne, Daniel W. Drezner, Colin Dueck, Eric Edelman, Martha Finnemore, Lawrence Freedman, Francis Fukuyama, Michael D. Gambone, Lynne Chandler Garcia, Bishop Garrison, Erik Gartzke, Mauro Gilli, Robert Gilpin, T.X. Hammes, Michael C. Horowitz, G. John Ikenberry, Bruce D. Jones, Tim Kane, Cheryl A. Kearney, David Kilcullen, Michael P. Kreuzer, Miriam Krieger, Seth Lazar, Keir A. Lieber, Conway Lin, Jon R. Lindsay, Austin Long, Joseph S. Lupa Jr., Megan H. MacKenzie, Mike J. Mazarr, Senator John McCain, Daniel H. McCauley, Michael E. McInerney, Christopher D. Miller, James N. Miller, John A. Nagl, Henry R. Nau, Renée de Nevers, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Michael E. O'Hanlon, Mancur Olson Jr., Sue Payton, Daryl G. Press, Thomas Rid, John Riley, David Sacko, Brandon D. Smith, James M. Smith, Don M. Snider, Sir Hew Strachan, Michael Wesley, Richard Zeckhauser