Biases In Survey Inflation Expectations Evidence From The Euro Area

This paper documents five facts about inflation expectations in the euro area. First, individual inflation forecasts overreact to individual news. Second, the cross-section average of individual forecasts of inflation underreact to shocks initially, but overreacts in the medium term. Third, disagreement about future inflation increases in response to news when the current inflation is high, and declines when inflation is low, consistent with a zero lower bound of expectations. Fourth, overreaction of individual inflation forecasts to news increased after the global financial crisis (GFC). Fifth, the reaction of average expectations (and of actual inflation) to shocks became more muted post-GFC in the euro area, but not in the U.S.

Inflation is regarded by the many as a menace that damages business and can only make life worse for households. Keeping it low depends critically on ensuring that firms and workers expect it to be low. So expectations of inflation are a key influence on national economic welfare. This collection pulls together a galaxy of world experts (including Roy Batchelor, Richard Curtin and Staffan Linden) on inflation expectations to debate different aspects of the issues involved. The main focus of the volume is on likely inflation developments. A number of factors have led practitioners and academic observers of monetary policy to place increasing emphasis recently on inflation expectations. One is the spread of inflation targeting, invented in New Zealand over 15 years ago, but now encompassing many important economies including Brazil, Canada, Israel and Great Britain. Even more significantly, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the United States Federal Bank are the leading members of another group of monetary institutions all considering or implementing moves in the same direction. A second is the large reduction in actual inflation that has been observed in most countries over the past decade or so. These considerations underscore the critical – and largely underrecognized - importance of inflation expectations. They emphasize the importance of the issues, and the great need for a volume that offers a clear, systematic treatment of them. This book, under the steely editorship of Peter Sinclair, should prove very important for policy makers and monetary economists alike.

This paper exploits a very large multi-country survey of consumers to investigate empirically the relationship between inflation expectations and consumer spending. We document that for the Euro Area and almost all of its constituent countries this relationship is generally positive: a higher expected change in inflation is associated with an increase in the probability that a given consumer will make major purchases. Moreover, in line with the predictions of macroeconomic theory, the impact is stronger when the lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding. Also, using the estimated spending probabilities from our micro-level analysis, we indirectly estimate the impact of a gradual increase in inflation expectations on aggregate private consumption. We find the effects to be economically relevant, especially when the lower bound is binding.

Do euro area inflation expectations remain well-anchored? This paper finds that the protracted period of low (and below-target) inflation in the euro area since 2013 has weakened their anchoring. Testing their sensitivity to inflation and macroeconomic news, this paper expands existing results in two key dimensions. First, by analyzing all available (advanced) inflation releases. Second, the reactions of expectations are investigated at daily, time-varying and intraday frequency regressions to add robustness to our conclusions. Results point to a significant impact of inflation news over recent years that had not been observed before in the euro area.

This paper examines the anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area based on data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The analysis shows that the overall distribution of medium- and long-term inflation forecasts has changed considerably following the global financial crisis. Moreover, micro level expectations of professional forecasters are found to be sensitive to short-term economic developments. These patterns suggest that euro area inflation expectations are significantly less anchored to the ECB's definition of price stability in recent years compared to the pre-crisis period.

The paper analyses the anchoring of inflation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers in the euro area. We study anchoring, defined as the central bank's ability to manage expectations, by paying special attention to the impact of the ECB inflation target and ECB inflation projections on inflation expectations. Our analysis indicates that longer-term inflation forecasts have become somewhat more sensitive to shorter-term forecasts and to actual HICP inflation in the post-crisis period. We also find that the ECB inflation projections have recently become more important for short- and medium-term professional forecasts and at the same time the role of the ECB inflation target for those expectations has diminished. Overall, our analysis suggests that in recent years inflation expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.

Disagreement in inflation expectations observed from survey data varies systematically over time in a way that reflects the level and variance of current inflation. This paper offers a simple explanation for these facts based on asymmetries in the forecasters' costs of over- and under-predicting inflation. Our model implies (i) biased forecasts; (ii) positive serial correlation in forecast errors; (iii) a cross-sectional dispersion that rises with the level and the variance of the inflation rate; and (iv) predictability of forecast errors at different horizons by means of the spread between the short- and long-term variance of inflation. We find empirically that these patterns are present in inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. A constant bias component, not explained by asymmetric loss and rational expectations, is required to explain the shift in the sign of the bias observed for a substantial portion of forecasters around 1982.