Battle Report The War In Korea

Provides detailed maps of naval battles in the Pacific during World War II.

Not since Ernie Pyle have the American people taken any reporter to their hearts as they have Marguerite Higgins—the photogenic young war correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. This brilliant woman reporter, greatly admired by the fighting men, has dodged bullets with troops on the line, has asked neither favor nor privilege for herself, and has been commended publicly for bravery in helping grievously wounded men under fire. This is her up-front, personal report of the human side of the war. With the discerning eye of the expert reporter and the sympathy of a woman living through the agony of her countrymen, Miss Higgins tells the whole story of the bitter Korean campaign: young, green troops maturing in battle, Communist bullets kicking over the coffeepot at breakfast, the initial inadequacy of American arms, and the terrible price in men we are paying for unpreparedness. Miss Higgins also sketches brilliant thumbnail portraits of Generals MacArthur Walker, and Dean, and of many line and staff officers as well as GIs. In WAR IN KOREA she has written a tremendously compelling book that calls a spade a spade as it reveals the hell and heroism of an ordeal which compares to Valley Forge in the annals of American fighting men. Richly illustrated throughout with photographs by Carl Mydans of Life magazine and others.

Annotation At the pivotal battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni in February 1951, U.N. forces met and contained large-scale attacks by Chinese forces. Col. Paul Freeman and the larger-than-life Col. Ralph Monclar led the American 23rd Infantry Regiment and the French Bataillon de Coree, respectively. In this careful consideration of combat leadership at all levels, Kenneth E. Hamburger details the actions of these units, offering stories of men sustaining themselves and one another to the limits of human endurance. He analyzes the roles that training, cohesion, morale, logistics, and leadership play in success or failure on the front lines, providing a well-organized discussion that is sure to become a classic in the field of leadership studies. Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, Eighth Army commander, and Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar, the French Battalion commander, March 1951.

War in Korea, first published in 1951 as War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent, is journalist Marguerite Higgins' illustrated account of her experiences with American fighting troops during the Korean war. From the original dust jacket: Not since Ernie Pyle have the American people taken any reporter to their hearts as they have Marguerite Higgins-the photogenic young war correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. This brilliant woman reporter, greatly admired by the fighting men, has dodged bullets with troops on the line, has asked neither favor nor privilege for herself, and has been commended publicly for bravery in helping grievously wounded men under fire. This is her up-front, personal report of the human side of the war. With the discerning eye of the expert reporter and the sympathy of a woman living through the agony of her countrymen, Miss Higgins tells the whole story of the bitter Korean campaign: young, green troops maturing in battle, Communist bullets kicking over the coffeepot at breakfast, the initial inadequacy of American arms, and the terrible price in men we are paying for unpreparedness. Miss Higgins also sketches brilliant thumbnail portraits of Generals MacArthur, Walker, and Dean, and of many line and staff officers as well as GIs. In War in Korea she has written a tremendously compelling book that calls a spade a spade as it reveals the hell and heroism of an ordeal which compares to Valley Forge in the annals of American fighting men.

"6,031 pages of United States Military documents dating from 1950 to1992, mostly from the early 1950's, composed of after actions reports, lesson learned bulletins, and other reports dealing with the assessment of combat activity during the Korean War, archived on CD-ROM. Materials include: After Action Reports 3,567 pages of Korean War after action combat reports from various Naval vessels including: Air Task Group 1 & 2, Carrier Air Group 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15, USS Antietam, USS Badoeng Strait, USS Bairoko, USS Bataan, USS Bon Homme Richard, USS Boxer, USS Essex, USS Kearsarge, USS Lake Champlain, USS Leyte, USS Oriskany, USS Point Cruz, USS Princeton, USS Rendova, USS Sicily and USS Valley Forge. Dissemination of Combat Information from Korea Bulletins, 760 pages of Dissemination of Combat Information from Korea Bulletins, from November 1951 to December 1953. These bulletins are made up of extracts from previously confidential and secret command reports. The material cover problems, solutions, suggestions, and lessons learned from combat experience during the Korean War. Hundreds of topics cover every aspect of on the ground and in the air combat situations, from the effectiveness of major weapons systems, equipment, personnel, tactics, ammunition, to experiments with the use of plastic mess trays. Operation Chromite - Inchon Landing - X Corps Report, Oct 1950, An October 1950 report on the September 1950 Inchon Invasion. On 15 September 1950, after hurling itself fruitlessly against the Pusan Perimeter for nearly a month and a half, the weakened North Korean army was suddenly confronted with a grave threat at its rear. U.S. Marines had landed at the western port city of Inchon, near Seoul, and were poised to move inland to retake the capital and decisively cut the already tenuous North Korean supply lines. This amphibious operation was conceived by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Though strategically tempting, Inchon was a tactically challenging amphibious target, with long approaches through shallow channels, poor beaches and a tidal range that restricted landing operations to a few hours a day. It took all of General MacArthur's unparalleled powers of persuasion to sell his concept to doubting Army, Navy and Marine Corps commanders. Forces gathered for the Inchon invasion included the First Marine Division, the Army's Seventh Infantry Division, some South Korean units, virtually every available amphibious ship, and dozens of other Navy warships. Most of the Marines had recently arrived from the U.S., while the rest were withdrawn from the Pusan Perimeter defenses. Preliminary naval gunfire and air bombardment began on 13 September. The 1st and 5th Marines went ashore on the morning of the 15th. Resistance and casualties were modest, and initial objectives were quickly secured. Over the next several days, as supplies and troops poured ashore at Inchon, the Marines moved relentlessly toward Seoul. Kimpo airfield was taken on 17 September and was in use to support operations two days later. On 29 September, after days of hard street fighting, Seoul was returned to the South Korean government. Commentary on Infantry and Weapons, Korea, 1950-5, A report written in 1951, It focuses exclusively upon the campaign of the first winter in which 8th Army experienced its greatest and most prolonged stress. The conditions particular to that period provide the best opportunity for the clear profiling of weapons, tactical and leadership values in combat against the background of training methods and the armament program. Operations covered in this report include, Operation Punch, Battle of Chosen Resovir, and the Battle Chongchon River. The author of the report developed the post-combat company critique technique in the Central Pacific Theater and then applied it in European Theater during World War II. He used the same general method in Korea, beginning with the November 1950 battle. The report gives precise detail on the logistics of the infantry fight and place primary emphasis on the fighting characteristics of the new opponent. The commentary is divided into three parts, the behavior of men in the use of weapons, the behavior of weapons as men use them, and the use of information in augmenting fighting power. The first draft of this work was studied and criticized by 43 divisional, regimental, and battalion commanders who had successfully led troops in the winter campaign. They were asked to give it the best of their attention, strengthening, sharpening, and refining it where needed. The Employment of Armor in Korea Volume I - A 1951 report. The body of this report is largely concerned with armor activity during the period 1 July 1950 to 21 January 1951. Activity between 21 January 1951 and 8 April 1951. The report covers factors influencing the employment of tanks in Korea, including terrain and trafficability, tank-infantry teamwork and communications, cold weather operation and maintenance, and logistic support are also part of this discussion. In addition, sections have been devoted to recommendations and suggestions from personnel of armored units and on the suitability of the various types of tanks actually employed in Korea. Includes a brief study on the economies of the use of the M46 tanks, as compared with the then new medium tank T42. Enemy Tactics, Techniques & Doctrine, Intelligence Studies, 1951- A group of studies compiled in 1951, which were previously published in Periodic Intelligence Reports of IX Corps and some of which at the time were being published for the first time. According to the report the individual works are a result of the collation of information from all sources. Where possible, intensive interrogations of prisoners of war were conducted in order to determine first hand, the actual tactics practiced and doctrine followed rather than to rely wholly upon captured documents, the contents of which, in many cases, were not adhered to. Battle of Osan, 5 July 1950 A 1969 report on the Battle of Osan. The Battle of Osan was the first engagement of the Korean War involving American troops. It was fought by a battalion-size force to delay the opposition's advance while its parent unit, the 24th Infantry Division, entered Korea through the port of Pusan and assembled around Taejon in early July 1950, soon after the beginning of the North Korean Communist invasion of South Korea. The battle is of significance because it illustrates the importance of fire effectiveness, unit training, reliable equipment, leadership, and military discipline. The holding action at Osan revealed many weaknesses in the equipment and personnel of the American Army of 1950 and in its uses of fire and maneuver in a delaying action. Battle of Chipyong-ni, February 1951. A 1990 report on the battle at Chipyong-n. At Chipyong-ni, Chinese forces suffered their first tactical defeat since entering the Korean War in November 1950. An all-out Chinese offensive had been broken and their withdrawal from the crossroads village, a keystone of Eighth Army's central front, signaled a pullback all along the Chinese line of advance southward. If Chlpyong-ni had fallen, the entire United Nations Command front would have been severely endangered. General Ridgway regarded the defense of Chipyong-ni as the turning point in the Eighth Army's revitalization. After defeating the massive Chinese effort, the U.S. Army advanced steadily northward, recaptured Seoul by mid-March 1951, and by the first day of spring stood just below the 38th parallel. Other Reports include: Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Korea 1950, Memos, X Corps. Enemy Tactics in Korea, Field Study, December 1951 Ineffective Soldier Performance Under Fire, Korea, 1951 North Korean Defensive Tactics, Reports, 1951 Psywar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea, Study, Aug 1953 Integration of Koreans into US Units, 1950-1953 Structure of a Battle: Analysis of a UN-UK Action North of Taegu, Korea, Sept 1950 United Nations Partisan Warfare Korea 1951-1954, Operations Research Report 1956 Task Force Smith at Osan as Leadership Failure, Paper, 1992"--Http://www.paperlessarchives.com/korean_war_after_action_report. html.

Striking Back: Combat in Korea, March-April 1951 is the second book in a three-volume series about the Korean War, examining the fighting that occurred during the late winter and early spring of the war's first year. By the beginning of March, UN forces shifted strategic focus from defense to offense. In April, the combination of stabilized fronts and the enemy's failed attacks made conditions ideal for launching combat offensives. The brutal nature and strategic significance of these campaigns is described in the book, which includes analysis of their profound influence on the remainder of the war. William T. Bowers provides detailed battle narratives based on eyewitness accounts recorded by Army historians within days of the operations. Through his use of personal accounts, official records, war diaries, and combat reports, Bowers sheds new light on the conflict in Korea, making this volume a must-read for military historians.