Ballistic Missile Defence And The Alliance

Yost suggests that the challenges for Western policy posed by Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs stem partly from Soviet military programs, Soviet arms control policies, and Soviet public diplomacy campaigns, and partly from the West's own intra-alliance disagreements and lack of consensus about Western security requirements.

In 2010, NATO decided to expand its ballistic missile defense program, in part because of the American offer to include its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as the centerpiece of an expanded effort. For the Allies' part, few have actually contributed tangible ballistic missile defense assets, in terms of missile interceptors, radars or other sensors, or ballistic missile defense-related platforms. This is likely to have significant implications for the U.S. Army, which has an important but largely underappreciated role in NATO missile defense today. In particular, the Army is likely to face increased manpower demands, materiel requirements, and training needs in order to meet the demand signal created by the NATO ballistic missile defense program. Additionally, Army units involved directly in or in support of ballistic missile defense are likely to face a higher OPTEMPO than currently projected. Ultimately, this will exacerbate the perceived imbalance in transatlantic burden-sharing, particularly if the EPAA provides little, if any, benefit to the defense of U.S. territory, given Washington's decision to cancel Phase 4 of that framework.

Short-range missiles in Third World arsenals pose a serious threat to forward employed U.S. and allied military forces. The acquisition of longer- range missiles has the potential to extend that threat to the population and territory of the United States and its allies. While NATO member states have agreed to develop Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems to support forward- deployed troops, they continue to dispute which TMD systems ought to be developed and whether territorial or population defenses ought to be built. In this long-standing dispute, the United States has often found itself at odds with its European allies. This thesis argues that ballistic missile defense remains a potential source of friction between the United States and its European allies, but for substantially different reasons than in the Cold War era. The strategic and political differences which alienated allies during the Cold War have been replaced by economic considerations and the inability to develop a unified BMD strategy. These factors continue to make BMD a divisive issue. To prevent the erosion of Alliance relations, the United States must show greater sensitivity to the interests of its European allies, who in turn must exhibit a greater commitment to NATO goals.

In 2010, NATO decided to expand its ballistic missile defense program, in part because of the American offer to include its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as the centerpiece of an expanded effort. For the Allies' part, few have actually contributed tangible ballistic missile defense assets, in terms of missile interceptors, radars or other sensors, or ballistic missile defense-related platforms. This is likely to have significant implications for the U.S. Army, which has an important but largely underappreciated role in NATO missile defense today. In particular, the Army is likely to face increased manpower demands, materiel requirements, and training needs in order to meet the demand signal created by the NATO ballistic missile defense program. Additionally, Army units involved directly in or in support of ballistic missile defense are likely to face a higher OPTEMPO than currently projected. Ultimately, this will exacerbate the perceived imbalance in transatlantic burden-sharing, particularly if the EPAA provides little, if any, benefit to the defense of U.S. territory, given Washington's decision to cancel Phase 4 of that framework.

NATO and the United States are actively pursuing missile defense policies. NATO has invested in the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) information network to support the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) capabilities of specific Allies for the protection of forward deployed troops, and studies of the feasibility and political-military implications of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) for the protection of NATO territory, forces and population centers. The U.S. program includes TMD activities in cooperation with NATO Allies, such as Patriot, as well as BMD research and deployment. The U.S. proposal to deploy BMD system elements in Poland and the Czech Republic has led to more extensive discussions of BMD in the Alliance. The North Atlantic Council made BMD-relevant decisions in April 2008. The United States and its NATO Allies nonetheless seem to differ greatly on the urgency and importance of pursuing BMD. TMD generates far more cooperation and support within the Alliance than does BMD for the protection of NATO territory, forces and population centers. This thesis compares TMD and BMD policies within the Alliance in an attempt to identify the causes of disagreements on BMD policy and to propose a course of action that may meet the Alliance's goals.

This report discusses how successive U.S. governments have urged the creation of an anti-missile system to protect against long-range ballistic missile threats from adversary states. The proposed U.S. system has encountered resistance in some European countries and beyond.

En summarisk analyse af strategiske forhold i forbindelse med udviklingen af SDI samt politiske betragtninger over USAs allieredes reaktioner på SDI. Modtaget fra USIS