Army Needs To Improve Its Management And Inventory Control Of Small Arms

Because of their cost, vital role in defense missions, and sensitivity to theft, military small arms require careful management and control. In response to a congressional request, GAO investigated certain aspects of Department of Defense (DOD) procurement, management, and disposition of small arms including the M2 machine gun. The M2 machine gun has been used by all U.S. military components since the end of World War I. The Army, which owns more than 75 percent of all M2 guns in DOD inventories, is designated the single procuring agent for all of DOD. Further, the Army is responsible for maintaining a central registry of the serial numbers of all DOD small arms. The Army has not established or maintained accurate inventory information needed to effectively manage its M2 machine gun program. Army inventory control systems do not provide reliable information on either the quantity or the condition of M2 assets. The Army does not have adequate procedures for obtaining information on the status of other services' inventories. Deficiencies in the DOD program for keeping serial number control of M2 machine guns and other small arms have prevented the achievement of expected asset visibility and physical controls over small arms inventories. These inventory control problems were not new to the Army or DOD. For many years, Army stocks of M2 machine guns far exceeded estimated requirements, so they were sold or given to foreign countries or disassembled for needed repair parts. The resulting depletion and a rapid increase in M2 requirements have caused a shortage of the weapons. GAO found that the Army was contemplating additional disassembly of almost 2,000 guns to obtain repair parts. In view of the current shortage, GAO believed that further disassembly was not justified.

Because of their cost, vital role in defense missions, and sensitivity to theft, military small arms require careful management and control. In response to a congressional request, GAO investigated certain aspects of Department of Defense (DOD) procurement, management, and disposition of small arms including the M2 machine gun. The M2 machine gun has been used by all U.S. military components since the end of World War I. The Army, which owns more than 75 percent of all M2 guns in DOD inventories, is designated the single procuring agent for all of DOD. Further, the Army is responsible for maintaining a central registry of the serial numbers of all DOD small arms. The Army has not established or maintained accurate inventory information needed to effectively manage its M2 machine gun program. Army inventory control systems do not provide reliable information on either the quantity or the condition of M2 assets. The Army does not have adequate procedures for obtaining information on the status of other services' inventories. Deficiencies in the DOD program for keeping serial number control of M2 machine guns and other small arms have prevented the achievement of expected asset visibility and physical controls over small arms inventories. These inventory control problems were not new to the Army or DOD. For many years, Army stocks of M2 machine guns far exceeded estimated requirements, so they were sold or given to foreign countries or disassembled for needed repair parts. The resulting depletion and a rapid increase in M2 requirements have caused a shortage of the weapons. GAO found that the Army was contemplating additional disassembly of almost 2,000 guns to obtain repair parts. In view of the current shortage, GAO believed that further disassembly was not justified.

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's management of small arms parts for all the services, focusing on whether inventory controls, oversight by higher commands, and physical security were adequate to deter or detect thefts at four depots. GAO found that: (1) an analysis of one depot's inventory records disclosed significant inventory control problems, including large and consistent losses of small arms parts, failure to complete required annual inventories of small arms parts, and inventories based on estimates rather than actual counts; (2) such inventory control problems were primarily due to the low priority management attached to physical inventories, poor resource management, inadequate warehouse maintenance, and strained storage capacity; (3) the three oversight commands lacked adequate information, objectivity, and followup to effectively monitor inventory management at Army depots; (4) the Army's lack of minimum security standards addressing methods for minimizing the risk of employee thefts allowed depot commanders broad discretion over physical security measures; (5) three depots lacked the necessary infrastructure to easily restrict access to the warehouse area; (6) the depots failed to use available resources to improve security; (7) a May 1991 Department of Defense (DOD) physical security regulation provided broad guidance on the minimum standards needed to protect material in its supply system and should provide a framework for ensuring that all the services have reasonable, consistent security standards; and (8) as a result of GAO studies, one depot began making improvements to its inventory controls and physical security.

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