Arms Control And National Security

"Based on a special issue (fall 1960) of Daedalus." Bibliography: p. 457-470.

This book accessibly and expertly details the history and implications of the BWC—the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention—a controversial arms control agreement drafted in the 1970’s meant to supplement the Geneva protocol for warfare from decades earlier. That treaty banned the use of biological weapons in modern warfare, but failed to ban their development, transport or trafficking, holes the BWC aimed to fill, but are still contested to this day. Daniel M. Gerstein, a former Army Colonel and current Under Secretary in the Department of Homeland Security, traces the origins of the treaty and its many complications, past and present, while prescribing a way for the world’s military leaders to move forward with regards to (what Gerstein sees will be and already is) “the most important arms control treaty of the 21st Century.” The strength and enforcement of the treaty are at a crossroads, and it is important for both professionals and students of the military and international affairs to know exactly what a failure to honor, improve and uphold the BWC would mean for international security.

In this closely reasoned and lucid analysis, an important thinker on American strategy surveys weapons technology and its military and political implications for the 1970s. J. I. Coffey refutes the argument that American national security requires "superior" strategic offensive forces or extensive air and missile defenses. In so doing he assesses in simple terms the various factors involved in this complex and difficult subject. While many books on strategy deal only with a single area or a particular weapons system, this work synthesizes technical and non-technical considerations across the whole range of national security issues affected by strategic power-war-fighting, deterrence, Communist behavior, alliance relationships, nuclear proliferation, and arms control. Its orderly and authoritative marshaling of tabulated data, its citations from Department of Defense documents and congressional hearings, and its classifications of the alternative options which strategy makers can now pursue, are all invaluable to both the student of national security and the professional strategist.

At the request of Congress, this report presents findings and recommendations related to governance of the U.S. government's monitoring, detection, and verification (MDV) enterprise and offers findings and recommendations related to technical MDV capabilities and research, development, test, and evaluation efforts, focused in particular on the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear test explosions, and arms control.

This facsimile reprint of the 1989 edition is, according to Library Journal, ..".a wonderfully concise and comprehensive resource on a very important topic. In 268 detailed entries, the authors provide a wealth of information on such topics as the arms race, conventional and nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and disarmament. The entries are cross-referenced, and there is an index. Of great value to general readers as well as specialists."

These essays, collected to commemorate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 25th anniversary, span not only ACDA's lifetime, but the four decades of the nuclear era. The articles provide a sampling of the arms-control-related speculation and controversy that has existed during those years. Since many of the authors are either current members of the U.S. Government or have strongly influenced its policy over the years, these essays on the formulation of U.S. arms control and national security policies have almost assumed the status of classics. The authors represented include Fred Ikle, Henry Rowen, Paul Nitze, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, and James Schlesinger. S/N 044-000-02164-1: $12.00.

For more than forty years, the United States has maintained a public commitment to nuclear disarmament, and every president from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama has gradually reduced the size of America's nuclear forces. Yet even now, over two decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States maintains a huge nuclear arsenal on high alert and ready for war. The Americans, like the Russians, the Chinese, and other major nuclear powers, continue to retain a deep faith in the political and military value of nuclear force, and this belief remains enshrined at the center of U.S. defense policy regardless of the radical changes that have taken place in international politics. In No Use, national security scholar Thomas M. Nichols offers a lucid, accessible reexamination of the role of nuclear weapons and their prominence in U.S. security strategy. Nichols explains why strategies built for the Cold War have survived into the twenty-first century, and he illustrates how America's nearly unshakable belief in the utility of nuclear arms has hindered U.S. and international attempts to slow the nuclear programs of volatile regimes in North Korea and Iran. From a solid historical foundation, Nichols makes the compelling argument that to end the danger of worldwide nuclear holocaust, the United States must take the lead in abandoning unrealistic threats of nuclear force and then create a new and more stable approach to deterrence for the twenty-first century.