Arms Control And Great Power Interests In The Korean Peninsula

Since the end of the Korean War, both North and South Korea have been building up their military power. This arms race has increased the risk of a military conflict between the North and South which could result in major power involvement. In recent years, various measures have been attempted to enhance stability in Korea to no avail. When the situation becomes more favorable for negotiations, the most difficult problem will be arms control. This paper discusses the interests of the two countries and of the four major powers involved and suggests a suitable format for arms control agreements.

This book addresses the issue that is whether the new Eas and West atmosphere of detente and arms reduction can smother the sparks of conflict on the Korean peninsula and perhaps illuminate the path to a Korea reunified as a democratic state.

The Korean Peninsula was and is in a state of flux.More than 60 years after the war that left the country divided, the policies and unpredictability of the North Korean regime, in conjunction with the U.S. alliance with South Korea and the involvement of China in the area, leave the situation there one of the most capricious on the globe. Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula presents the opinions from experts on the subject matter from the policy, military, and academic communities. Drawn from talks at a conference in September 2010 at Marine Corps University, the papers explore the enduring security challenges, the state of existing political and military relationships, the economic implications of unification, and the human rights concerns within North and South Korea. They also reiterate the importance for the broader East Asia region of peaceful resolution of the Korean issues.

In the past 40 years, arms control has become a central activity of international relations, playing a critical role in underpinning the balance of power. This book examines the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the potential for using arms control to reduce tension and enhance confidence between the two Koreas.

First published in 1998, this volume examines East Asia, especially Northeast Asia, which has been a region of considerable political security of importance for several key reasons. It features several great and medium powers: China, Japan and Russia, as well as North and South Korea. Even though no arms race is yet discernible among these states (with the partial exception of the two Koreas), it is conceivable that one might commence. If it did, the level of militarization could become quite alarming, if only because of the tremendous and rapidly growing economic potential of the regional states. Even though relations among regional sates (except the two Koreas) are currently peaceful, the region features several unresolved issues (e.g. concerning territory) and a historical legacy of enmity between several states. To prevent such conflicts of interest from erupting into armed conflict is of the utmost importance. A stabilizing factor is that the military potentials in the region are still predominantly defensively oriented, i.e. most states lack the requisite power projection or invasion capabilities to inflict serious harm on each other. However, this might change in the not-so-distant future. Hence the importance of confidence-building measures; of an institutionalization of regional relations; and of a strengthening of commitments to defensive military strategies and postures.

This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation on the peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valuable ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a firm commitment from the Obama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustained political pressure, in addition to increased efforts to contain proliferation. It notes that China's participation in this effort is vital. Indeed, the report makes clear that any hope of North Korea's dismantling its nuclear program rests on China's willingness to take a strong stance. For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that the long-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the region than the short-term risk of instability. The report also recognizes that robust relations between Washington and its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, must underpin any efforts to deal with the North Korean problem. It looks as well at regime change and scenarios that could lead to reunification of the peninsula. At the same time that the Task Force emphasizes the danger and urgency of North Korea's behavior, it recognizes and applauds the beneficial U.S. relationship with South Korea, which has proved to be a valuable economic and strategic partner. In this vein, the Task Force advocates continued close coordination with Seoul and urges prompt congressional passage of the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement.

This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula), the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other.

This thought-provoking volume provides a valuable overarching framework towards a more informed understanding of how South Korea's relationship with the outside world has evolved in the twentieth century and the manner in which it is likely to do business in the twenty-first.