Are Efficiency Wages Efficient

The contributors explore the reasons why involuntary unemployment happens when supply equals demand.

What is Efficiency Wage The term efficiency wages was introduced by Alfred Marshall to denote the wage per efficiency unit of labor. Marshallian efficiency wages are those calculated with efficiency or ability exerted being the unit of measure rather than time. That is, the more efficient worker will be paid more than a less efficient worker for the same amount of hours worked. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Efficiency wage Chapter 2: Labour economics Chapter 3: Minimum wage Chapter 4: New Keynesian economics Chapter 5: Phillips curve Chapter 6: Employment Chapter 7: Principal-agent problem Chapter 8: Personnel economics Chapter 9: Signalling (economics) Chapter 10: Labour market flexibility Chapter 11: Compensating differential Chapter 12: Insider-outsider theory of employment Chapter 13: Ekkehart Schlicht Chapter 14: Involuntary unemployment Chapter 15: Union wage premium Chapter 16: Monopsony Chapter 17: Rehn-Meidner model Chapter 18: Real rigidity Chapter 19: Wage compression Chapter 20: Shapiro-Stiglitz theory Chapter 21: Gift-exchange game (II) Answering the public top questions about efficiency wage. (III) Real world examples for the usage of efficiency wage in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Efficiency Wage.

We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers' efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non-shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.

This paper examines the role of the labor market in the transmission process of adjustment policies in developing countries. It begins by reviewing the recent evidence regarding the functioning of these markets. It then studies the implications of wage inertia, nominal contracts, labor market segmentation, and impediments to labor mobility for stabilization policies. The effect of labor market reforms on economic flexibility and the channels through which labor market imperfections alter the effects of structural adjustment measures are discussed next. The last part of the paper identifies a variety of issues that may require further investigation, such as the link between changes in relative wages and the distributional effects of adjustment policies.