Animals As Experiencing Entities

This volume explores the experiences of those with little or no power—usually, although not exclusively, animals. The theme of animals as experiencing entities is what links the chapters and characterises the volume. Broadly each author in this volume contributes in one of two ways. The first group, in Section 1, theoretically engages animal subjectivity, animal experiences, and ways in which these are to some extent accessible and knowable to humans. The second group of authors, in Section 2, offer narrative accounts about specific animals or groups of animals and explore to some extent their subjective historical experiences. In summary, the first section diversely theorises about animal experiences, while the second section’s authors assume animals’ subjective experiences and construct narratives that take into account how animals might have subjectively experienced historical phenomena.

Presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals

THE argument for animal rights, a classic since its appearance in 1983, from the moral philosophical point of view. With a new preface.

Animals were vital to the British colonization of Myanmar. In this pathbreaking history of British imperialism in Myanmar from the early nineteenth century to 1942, Jonathan Saha argues that animals were impacted and transformed by colonial subjugation. By examining the writings of Burmese nationalists and the experiences of subaltern groups, he also shows how animals were mobilized by Burmese anticolonial activists in opposition to imperial rule. In demonstrating how animals - such as elephants, crocodiles, and rats - were important actors never fully under the control of humans, Saha uncovers a history of how British colonialism transformed ecologies and fostered new relationships with animals in Myanmar. Colonizing Animals introduces the reader to an innovative historical methodology for exploring interspecies relationships in the imperial past, using innovative concepts for studying interspecies empires that draw on postcolonial theory and critical animal studies.

In Animal Minds, Donald R. Griffin takes us on a guided tour of the recent explosion of scientific research on animal mentality. Are animals consciously aware of anything, or are they merely living machines, incapable of conscious thoughts or emotional feelings? How can we tell? Such questions have long fascinated Griffin, who has been a pioneer at the forefront of research in animal cognition for decades, and is recognized as one of the leading behavioral ecologists of the twentieth century. With this new edition of his classic book, which he has completely revised and updated, Griffin moves beyond considerations of animal cognition to argue that scientists can and should investigate questions of animal consciousness. Using examples from studies of species ranging from chimpanzees and dolphins to birds and honeybees, he demonstrates how communication among animals can serve as a "window" into what animals think and feel, just as human speech and nonverbal communication tell us most of what we know about the thoughts and feelings of other people. Even when they don't communicate about it, animals respond with sometimes surprising versatility to new situations for which neither their genes nor their previous experiences have prepared them, and Griffin discusses what these behaviors can tell us about animal minds. He also reviews the latest research in cognitive neuroscience, which has revealed startling similarities in the neural mechanisms underlying brain functioning in both humans and other animals. Finally, in four chapters greatly expanded for this edition, Griffin considers the latest scientific research on animal consciousness, pro and con, and explores its profound philosophical and ethical implications.

This volume is a collection of fourteen essays by leading philosophers on issues concerning the nature, existence, and our knowledge of animal minds. The nature of animal minds has been a topic of interest to philosophers since the origins of philosophy, and recent years have seen significant philosophical engagement with the subject. However, there is no volume that represents the current state of play in this important and growing field. The purpose of this volume is to highlight the state of the debate. The issues which are covered include whether and to what degree animals think in a language or in iconic structures, possess concepts, are conscious, self-aware, metacognize, attribute states of mind to others, and have emotions, as well as issues pertaining to our knowledge of and the scientific standards for attributing mental states to animals.

Animal experimentation has been one of the most controversial areas of animal use, mainly due to the intentional harms inflicted upon animals for the sake of hoped-for benefits in humans. Despite this rationale for continued animal experimentation, shortcomings of this practice have become increasingly more apparent and well-documented. However, these limitations are not yet widely known or appreciated, and there is a danger that they may simply be ignored. The 51 experts who have contributed to Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm Change critically review current animal use in science, present new and innovative non-animal approaches to address urgent scientific questions, and offer a roadmap towards an animal-free world of science.

This study is a critique of Quine's views on three interrelated topics that figure prominently in his work and on which he has developed very distinctive opinions. Dr. Dilman provides detailed criticism of these views and contrasts them with Wittgenstein's understanding of the same topics. Throughout this systematic analysis, the author questions basic assumptions on which the Quinean edifice rests. The book argues that Quine's notion of ontology is riddled with inconsistencies and singles out examples for discussion. It argues that Quine's rejection of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths is unwarranted, and that the notion of analyticity, in terms of which he conducts this discussion, is a red herring. And it argues that the notion of experience and subordinate notion of the senses, which Quine uses to discuss the confirmation of propositions and to expound his brand of empiricism, are crude.