Amphibious Assault Falklands

A British Naval commander’s eyewitness account of the 1982 war in the South Atlantic. Since he was in charge of the amphibious operations in the Falklands War, it goes without saying that there is no one better qualified to tell the story of that aspect of the campaign than Commodore Michael Clapp. Here he describes, with considerable candor, some of the problems met in a Navy racing to war and finding it necessary to recreate a largely abandoned operational technique in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. During the time it took to “go south,” some sense of order was imposed and a not very well defined command structure evolved, this was not done without generating a certain amount of friction. He tells of why San Carlos Water was chosen for the assault and the subsequent inshore operations. Michael Clapp and his small staff made their stand and can claim a major role in the defeat of the Argentine Air and Land Forces.

Amphibious assault ships have been at the centre of nearly all of Britain's expeditionary campaigns since World War II, from the Suez crisis of 1956 to operations as far afield as Borneo (1963–66), the Falklands (1982), Sierra Leone (2000) and Iraq (2003). In major operations such as Suez and the Falklands, the use of amphibious assault ships was essential to the military success of the campaigns. The Suez Crisis saw two of the Royal Navy's former light fleet carriers converted into 'commando carriers' to specialise in amphibious warfare. In the 1960s these were followed by the famous Fearless class ships – the first purpose-built amphibious assault ships in the Royal Navy. With an internal dock, headquarters capability, and multiple landing craft, these 'Landing Platform Docks' were built to project power around the world. When the Falklands were invaded, HMS Fearless was the key to the successful landing in San Carlos. In the 1990s, a new generation was ordered: the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean and the Albion class LPDs. In recent years Ocean, Albion and Bulwark have been the largest fighting ships of the Royal Navy and have acted as the navy's flagships, as well as being perhaps the most versatile ships in the navy. This title is an essential guide to British Amphibious Assault Ships across the decades, from the mighty Fearless to the modern Albion. Packed with full-colour illustrations, contemporary photography, and detailed analysis, this definitive work explores the history, development, and deployment of the Royal Navy's front line.

Leading international military and academic experts analyse 37 amphibious operations from the 'how not to do it' catastrophe of Gallipoli in 1915, through the Second World War, Vietnam and the Falklands, to the Al Faw landings in Iraq in 2003. German, Japanese and Soviet operations are included.

Conventional military wisdom holds that the amphibious assault against a defended beach is the most difficult of all military operations--yet modern amphibious landings have been almost universally successful. This apparent contradiction is fully explored in this first look at 20th-century amphibious warfare from the perspective of the defender. The author, Col. Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC (Ret.), examines amphibious operations from Gallipoli to the Falkland Islands to determine why the defenders were unable to prevent the attackers from landing or to throw them back into the sea after they had fought their way ashore. He places the reader in the defenders' shoes as such epic battles as Normandy, Iwo Jima, and Inchon are planned and fought, and then uses these cases to explain why the defenders were unable to successfully defend against enemy landings. A practitioner, teacher, and student of amphibious warfare, Colonel Gatchel follows those explanations with speculations on how a defender today might try to stop a landing and on the implications of such actions for future amphibious operations.

Highly illustrated, Amphibious Warfare takes the reader through the different stages of an amphibious campaign chapter by chapter, illustrating each with case studies from the last 100 years.

While many books have been written on the Falklands War, this is the first to focus on the vital aspect of logistics. The challenges were huge; the lack of preparation time; the urgency; the huge distances involved; the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four.??After a brief discussion of events leading to Argentina's invasion the book describes in detail the rush to re-organise and deploy forces, despatch a large task force, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the Task Force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theatre resupply, the set-backs and finally the restoring of order after victory.??Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties etc.??The lessons learnt have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs and this book fills an important gap.

The bestselling, highly-acclaimed and most famous account of the Falklands War, written by the commander of the British Task Force.

Reasons in Writing tells Southby-Tailyour's story of the Falklands War largely through the medium of diaries and letters written during his peacetime tour of duty in the seventies and the war itself. Reasons in Writing, is unlikely to be rivalled for its immediacy, insight and deep and genuine feeling for the Islands themselves, based on experience gained (unlike any other participant civilian or service) before, during and after that fateful winter of 1982.

A Royal Air Force veteran of the Falklands Conflict presents a comprehensive, myth-busting study of the air campaign. In the spring of 1982, Argentina and the UK engaged in tense combat over control of the Falkland Islands. The ten weeks of fighting are often portrayed with a decidedly one-sided narrative: either heroic Argentine pilots relentlessly pressing home their attacks, or the Sea Harrier force utterly dominating its Argentine enemies. In Air Power in the Falklands Conflict, RAF veteran John Shields presents a detailed and even-handed analysis of the Falkland Islands air war. As an RAF officer, John Shields spent two and a half years in the Falklands as an air defense navigator. Using recently released primary source material, Shields looks at the air campaign at the operational level. He develops a considered view of what should have occurred, and contrasts it with what actually happened. In so doing, John Shields has produced a comprehensive account of the air campaign that has demolished many of the enduring myths of this Cold War conflict.

A military logistics expert analyzes the detailed coordination employed by the British during the Falklands War in 1982. While many books have been written on the Falklands War, this is the first to focus on the vital aspect of logistics. The challenges were huge: the lack of preparation time, the urgency, the huge distances involved, and the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four. After a brief discussion of events leading to Argentina’s invasion, the book details the rush to re-organize and deploy forces, dispatch a large task force, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the task force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theatre resupply, the set-backs, and finally the restoring of order after victory. Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties, etc. The lessons learned have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs, and this book fills an important gap. “With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We should all be grateful.” —Michael Clapp, Commander Amphibious Task Force “A timely book that explores the logistical challenges of projecting decisive combat power across transoceanic distances.” —Marine Corps Gazette