America The Eu And Strategic Culture

This book provides a provocative analysis of relations between Europe and America during the tempestuous years 1998-2004. Analysing EU foreign policy, it concludes that the lessons learnt in interacting with America have been crucial in shaping the emerging EU strategic culture.The book challenges established orthodoxy regarding the sui generis nat

In 2003 the idea that Americans were from Mars and Europeans from Venus stirred up serious conversation about the nature of the transatlantic relationship on both sides of the Atlantic. While useful in prompting discussion, the introduction of pop-psychology terminology into IR lexicon was essentially divisive and not analytically helpful. Kagan relied on journalistic generalization, rather than tested academic methods to support his work. This study rectifies that deficiency, exploring the extent that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus by deploying the analytical concept of strategic culture for an un-biased analysis of transatlantic drift.

The Quest for a European Strategic Culture investigates whether strategic norms and beliefs held in different countries have become more similar since 1989 and explores the implications for the viability of a common European Security and Defence Policy. The empirical evidence emerging from various sources shows some significant changes.

With the Lisbon Treaty in place and the European Union increasingly involved in international crisis management and stabilization operations in places near and far, this volume revisits the trajectory of a European strategic culture. Specifically, it studies the usefulness of its application in a variety of circumstances, including the EU’s operations in Africa and the Balkans as well as joint operations with NATO and the United Nations. The contributors find that strategic culture is a useful tool to explain and understand the EU's civilian and military operations, not in the sense of a ‘cause’, but as a European normative framework of preferences and constraints. Accordingly, classical notions of strategic culture in the field of international security must be adapted to highlight the specific character of Europe's strategic culture, especially by taking the interaction with the United Nations and NATO into account. Though at variance over the extent to which security and defence missions have demonstrated or promoted a shared strategic culture in Europe, the authors reveal a growing sense that a cohesive strategic culture is critical in the EU’s ambition of being a global actor. Should Europe fail to nurture a shared strategic culture, its actions will be based much more on flexibility than on cohesion. This book was published as a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy.

The post-Cold War period is coming to an end. After a decade of foreign policy integration Europe faces multipolarity internally divided and externally weak. Toje argues that due to the lack of a workable decision-making mechanism the EU is destined to play the limited but distinct role of a small power in global politics.

After years of mutual resentment and tension, there is a sudden recognition that the real interests of America and its European allies are diverging sharply and that the trans-atlantic relationship itself has changed, possibly irreversibly. Europe sees the United States as high-handed, unilateralist, and unnecessarily belligerent; the United States sees Europe as spent, unserious, and weak. The anger and mistrust on both sides are hardening into incomprehension. Author Robert Kagan reached incisively into this impasse to force both sides to see themselves through the eyes of the other. Tracing the widely differing histories of Europe and America since the end of World War II, he makes clear how for one the need to escape a bloody past has led to a new set of transnational beliefs about power and threat, while the other has evolved into the guarantor of that "postmodern paradise" by dint of its might and global reach.

The post-September 11th security policies of Poland, the UK, France, the US and Germany presented in this new book illustrate how and why the Atlantic community ruptured over Iraq, a result in part, it is argued, of the existence of particular national strategic cultures. Whilst the longer term effects of Iraq for the transatlantic security agenda have yet to fully transpire, what is certain is that the EU's ambitions to become a credible security actor have been seriously questioned, as has the notion of multilateralism as an international norm, as has the function of international law. The book addresses these issues by considering the evolution of the EU's role in the world and the development of American perspectives on the transatlantic security agenda. This volume was previously published as a special issue of the journal European Security.

This study examines the transatlantic security divide through the strategic culture lens, taking a comparative case study approach. It analyzes the emergent EU strategic culture by looking at the European Security Strategy, European security elite speeches, and ESDP operations. It examines the same evidence to determine the predominant trends in American strategic culture during Operation Iraqi Freedom and finds the greatest divide in the ideational foundation of operations, particularly as concerns perceptions of legitimacy. In the area of multilateralism, there is a greater similarity than is usually argued as concerns ad hoc coalitions of the willing: the EU forms coalitions with non-EU partners, allows individual members to decide whether to contribute troops and thus carry financial obligations or not, and now opens up the possibility for 'structured enhanced cooperation' in ESDP, despite the legitimacy derived from institutionalized cooperation stressed in public. The use of force only as a last resort is upheld by both in public diplomacy; however, in reality both keep all options open of when to act, even though the EU does stress less the use of force and more crisis prevention and non-military tools, while the U.S. intervention in Iraq was instrumentally declared as a last resort.

A much-needed survey and synopsis of literature on strategic culture and ways of war. It clearly shows how national strategies and approaches to warfare are, to a significant extent, culturally determined. The concept of national ‘ways of war’ dates from the 1930s, when Basil H. Liddell Hart theorized that there was a ‘British Way in Warfare’. The concept of "strategic culture" dates from the 1970s, when Jack Snyder introduced it to explain why leaders of the Soviet Union did not behave according to rational choice theory. These ideas have gained wide acceptance among historians of international politics and warfare, and remain controversial for political scientists seeking general or universal theoretical understanding of such subjects. Because political scientists have focused on strategic culture and historians on ways of war, this work will greatly benefit both audiences and provide each with valuable exposure to the ideas of the other.

The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany’s post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China’s rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany’s armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany’s current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin’s European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that: Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than rejecting the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power – including military power – in international affairs. The authors show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy.