Allied Against Terrorism

The United States has long faced numerous problems when fighting insurgencies. Many of these concern the performance of local allies, who typically playa leading role in counterinsurgency. In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Hyman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa'ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime's perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces' effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies' weaknesses.

There is now broad recognition that even the most powerful of countries cannot successfully fight terrorism on its own. Cross-border cooperation is necessary to trace funding, disrupt planning, and thwart new attacks as well as to investigate, capture, and prosecute terrorists and their supporters should those preventive efforts fail. While the initial impulse for effective action may come from individual states, sustaining it requires ongoing coordination. Five years after the attacks of September 11, what are the prospects for the global counterterrorism campaign? Allied against Terrorism is an up-to-date assessment of the global efforts to combat terrorism. Beginning with a look at the effectiveness of the international measures against terrorist violence already in place, Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand give a rigorous analysis of the United Nations-led campaign of nonmilitary measure to combat global terrorist threats, identifying some successes but also detailing the many shortcomings of the UN's operation units and political bodies responsible for counterterrorism. Millar and Rosand offer a number of reform suggestions to make UN efforts more coherent and effective, but argue that these reforms are only an interim stage in coordinating an effective global counterterrorism campaign: what truly is needed is a new global organization dedicated to combating terrorism. Millar and Rosand explore the tasks that a global counterterrorism organization could undertake and examine a wide array of possible models from which to draw in constructing such an organization. Offering specific examples of why the United States and other developed nations might be willing to support the creation of a dedicated organization, Millar and Rosand also assess how this organization would be welcomed by nations in the global South.

"The United States has long faced numerous problems when fighting insurgencies. Many of these concern the performance of local allies, who typically play a leading role in counterinsurgency. In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Hyman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa'ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime's perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces' effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies' weaknesses."--Foreword.

Flynn "lays out [the reasons he believes] why we have failed to stop terrorist groups from growing, and what we must do to stop them. The core message is that if you understand your enemies, it's a lot easier to defeat them--but because our government has concealed the actions of terrorists like bin Laden and groups like ISIS, and the role of Iran in the rise of radical Islam, we don't fully understand the enormity of the threat they pose against us"--Amazon.com.

Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism is number eight in the Combat Studies Institute s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work resulted from discussions at Fort Leavenworth about the nature of the enemy facing the United States and its allies since 11 September 2001. Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network had been present at some level in the national and international consciousness since the late 1990s. The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent global operations taken against Al Qaeda have brought this group to the forefront of the GWOT. While successes have been achieved in the GWOT, the enemy has proven to be resilient and adaptive. This study by Mr. Sean Kalic, of the Department of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College, examines modern transnational terrorism from the 1960s to the present day, with special emphasis on the adaptation Al Qaeda and other nonstate actors have taken in response to the actions of the United States and its allies. This work provides a cautionary warning about the likelihood Al Qaeda will continue to survive and execute missions in the current operating environment. Mr. Kalic synthesizes much of the pertinent literature and offers insights into the actions taken to ght terrorists. Most importantly, he advises a continual reevaluation of the threat, based on Al Qaeda's exibility, resiliency, and adaptability. Of cers and soldiers who have recently served in operations against the terrorist worldwide will certainly see utility here. As the US Army continues its efforts in combating terrorists, the thoughts found in this narrative are well worth considering.

Although military power is only one component of the portfolio of instruments that can be brought to bear in the fight against terrorist groups, military capabilities play unique and crucial roles in the overall strategy. These capabilities will call for a mix of forces somewhat different from those fielded today as well as new concepts and technologies. Equally challenging will be the tasks of training/advising friendly forces and protecting forces and interests around the world.

While the war on terrorism may have provided the rationale for the latest U.S. engagement with Pakistan, the present relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is at the crossroads of many other issues, such as Pakistan¿s own reform efforts, America¿s evolving strategic relationship with South Asia, democracy in the Muslim world, and the dual problems of religious extremism and nuclear proliferation. This report examines the history and present state of U.S.-Pakistan relations, addresses the key challenges the two countries face, and concludes with specific policy recommendations for ensuring the relationship meets the needs of both the U.S. and Pakistan.

Why winning the war on terrorism requires more than military might.

A “compelling and shocking account” of a brutal campaign of repression in Latin America, based on interviews and previously secret documents (The Miami Herald). Throughout the 1970s, six Latin American governments, led by Chile, formed a military alliance called Operation Condor to carry out kidnappings, torture, and political assassinations across three continents. It was an early “war on terror” initially encouraged by the CIA—which later backfired on the United States. Hailed by Foreign Affairs as “remarkable” and “a major contribution to the historical record,” The Condor Years uncovers the unsettling facts about the secret US relationship with the dictators who created this terrorist organization. Written by award-winning journalist John Dinges and updated to include later developments in the prosecution of Pinochet, the book is a chilling yet dispassionately told history of one of Latin America’s darkest eras. Dinges, himself interrogated in a Chilean torture camp, interviewed participants on both sides and examined thousands of previously secret documents to take the reader inside this underground world of military operatives and diplomats, right-wing spies and left-wing revolutionaries. “Scrupulous, well-documented.” —The Washington Post “Nobody knows what went wrong inside Chile like John Dinges.” —Seymour Hersh

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.