Air Power In Three Wars Wwii Korea Vietnam

[Includes over 130 illustrations and maps] This insightful work documents the thoughts and perspectives of a general with 35 years of history with the U.S. Air Force – General William W. Momyer. The manuscript discusses his years as a senior commander of the Air Force – strategy, command and control counter air operations, interdiction, and close air support. His perspectives cover World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

When I received the request to update my 1978 foreword to this book, I thought it might be useful to give my perspective of some aspects on the employment of airpower in the Persian Gulf War, the Air War over Serbia (Operation Allied Force), and the war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). It is not my intent to analyze air operations in these wars but to see if there are trends that might be appropriate for another war. I was particularly interested in the application of established airpower doctrine since I was deeply involved with it throughout my career. The Gulf War, in many respects, had many features of World War II. The first requirement in World War II was to gain and maintain air superiority to have freedom of action to carry out the destruction of Germany's ability to wage war and to create the most favorable conditions for the invasion of Europe (Operation Overlord). It was mandatory to establish air superiority so that the German air force wouldn't be able to attack the highly vulnerable landing force and the subsequent breakout. A vigorous interdiction campaign was initiated 60 days prior to the invasion to seal off the landing areas. Just prior to the assault, all airpower was turned to direct support of the landing force. As history records, air superiority was established and maintained; the area was successfully sealed off from German forces trying to get at the landing force; and all Allied airpower was directed to close air support until the main force had landed and operations were underway to engage the main forces of the Germans. It is of special interest that the German air force was able to fly only a few sorties, and those had no significant effect.

En analyse af anvendelsen af flystyrker under 2. verdenskrig, Koreakrigen og Vietnamkrigen.

This insightful work documents the thoughts and perspectives of a general with 35 years of history with the U.S. Air Force - General William W. Momyer. The manuscript discusses his years as a senior commander of the Air Force - strategy, command and control counter air operations, interdiction, and close air support. His perspectives cover World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

This publication is a reprint of General Momyer's book originally published in 1978. The book offers the general's observations, many from personal experience, of airpower in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. It is an account of the evolution of practical airpower through strategies and campaigns. The book examines strategy, command and control of airpower prior to and during the Vietnam conflict, air superiority, interdiction in all three wars, airpower and the ground battle, and experiences in blunting an attack using airpower.

Ultimately, this study is about a smaller Vietnam War than that which is commonly recalled. It focuses on expectations concerning the impact of air power on the ground war and on some of its actual effects, but it avoids major treatment of some of the most dramatic air actions of the war, such as the bombing of Hanoi. To many who fought the war and believe it ought to have been conducted on a still larger scale or with fewer restraints, this study may seem almost perverse, emphasizing as it does the utility of air power in conducting the conflict as a ground war and without total exploitation of our most awe-inspiring technology. Although the chapters in this study are intended to form a coherent and unified argument, each also offers discrete messages. The chapters are not meant to be definitive. They do not exhaust available documentary material, and they often rely heavily on published accounts. Nor do they provide a complete chronological picture of the uses of air power, even with respect to the ground war. Nor is coverage of areas in which air power was employed—South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam—evenly distributed nor necessarily proportionate to the effort expended in each place during the war. Lastly, some may find one or another form of air power either slightly or insufficiently treated. Such criticisms are beside the point, for the objectives of this study are to explore a comparatively neglected theme—the impact of air power on the ground—and to encourage further utilization of lessons drawn from the Vietnam experience.

Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.