Agreement For Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation With India

Agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with India: hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, September 18, 2008.

Agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with India : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, September 18, 2008.

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2007 im Fachbereich Politik - Region: Südasien, Note: 1,3, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Seminar für wissenschaftliche Politik), Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Das „123 Agreement” von 2007 zwischen Indien und den USA zur Kooperation auf dem Gebiet der Nukleartechnologie ist ein Meilenstein in den US-indischen Beziehungen mit weitreichenden Folgen nicht nur für diese beiden Staaten, sondern für die weltweite Nonproliferationspolitik und für die gesamte Staatengemeinschaft. Dieses ist – stark verkürzt – das Ergebnis der Untersuchung des auch als „N-Deal”, als „Nuclear-Deal” bezeichneten Abkommens zwischen Indien und den USA. Auf dem Weg zu diesem Ergebnis erläutert der Autor Intention und Inhalt der maßgeblichen Vertragswerke – insbesondere: des „123 Agreement” („Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy”) und des „Hyde Act” („An act to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India. Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.”) Der „Hyde Act” ist ein US-Sondererlaubnisgesetz für den Atomdeal mit Indien, denn eigentlich käme Indien aufgrund seines militärischen Atomprogramms für ein solches Abkommen gar nicht in Frage. Die Kritiker in den USA fürchten eine Konterkarierung der amerikanischen Nonproliferationspolitik. Der Autor beleuchtet, warum die USA dennoch den „N-Deal” initiierten und warum das Sondererlaubnisgesetz „Hyde Act” aus indischer Sicht die nationale Souveränität infrage stellt und deshalb unannehmbar ist. Das „123 Agreement” hingegen ermöglicht dank vieler Leerstellen und vager Formulierungen beiden Seiten eine Zustimmung. Angesichts der Differenzen zwischen „Hyde Act” und „123 Agreement” ist eine offene Frage, ob sich im Falle von Konflikten zukünftige US-Regierungen an die sich überlagernden Bestimmungen des nationalen Rechts („Hyde Act”) oder des internationalen Rechts („123 Agreement”) halten werden. In jedem Fall aber stellt das „123 Agreement” ein weitreichendes Entgegenkommen der USA gegenüber Indien und einen dramatischen Höhepunkt in den US-indischen Beziehungen dar. Um dieses zu verdeutlichen und um die Interessenslagen Indiens und der USA zu skizzieren, gibt der Autor einen Überblick über die bisherigen US-indischen Beziehungen mit besonderem Fokus auf deren Nuklearpolitik.

India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one. That is why, United States pays closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. The strategic significance of the nuclear deal, signed between India and the US, can be appreciated only in the context of the changing US geopolitical strategy and the evolving US-India relationship. This book addresses the wide-ranging issues concerning the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Making a critical assessment of India's energy policy, it describes in detail the agreement with IAEA, NSG waiver, the political fallouts of the deal, its implications for South Asia, and the China factor. The texts of the agreement, the Hyde Act, and India-IAEA Safeguards Agreements have also been appended.

The United States–India nuclear cooperation agreement to resume civilian nuclear technology trade with India—a non-signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and a defacto nuclear weapon state—is regarded as an impetuous shift in the US nuclear nonproliferation policy. The 2008 nuclear agreement aroused sharp reactions and unleashed a storm of controversies regarding the reversal of the US nonproliferation policy and its implications for the NPT regime. This book attempts to overcome the significant empirical and theoretical deficits in understanding the rationale for the change in the US nuclear nonproliferation policy toward India. This nuclear deal has been largely related to the US foreign policy objectives, especially establishing India as a regional counter-balance to China. The author examines the US–India nuclear cooperation agreement in a bilateral context, with regard to the nuclear regime. In past discourse India has been mainly viewed as a challenger to the nuclear regime, but this reflects the paucity in understanding India’s approach to the issue of nuclear weapons. The author relates the nuclear estrangement to the disjuncture between the US and India’s respective approach to nuclear weapons, evident during the negotiations that led to the framing of the NPT. The change in the US approach towards India, the nuclear outlier, has been exclusively linked to the Bush administration, which faced considerable criticism for sidelining the nonproliferation policy. This book instead traces the shifting of nuclear goalposts to the Clinton administration following the Pokhran II nuclear tests conducted by India. Contrary to the widespread perception that the decision to offer the nuclear technology to India was an impromptu decision by the Bush administration, the author contends that it was the result of a diligent process of bilateral dialogue and interaction. This book provides a detailed overview of the rationale and the developments that led to the agreement. Employing the regime theory, the author argues that the US–India nuclear agreement was neither an overturn of the US nuclear nonproliferation policy nor an unravelling of the NPT-centric regime. Rather, it was a strategic move to accommodate India, the anomaly within the regime.

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On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader, global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. Nonproliferation experts have argued that the potential costs of nuclear cooperation with India to U.S. and global nonproliferation policy may far exceed the benefits. At a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating a NSG exception. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. Some believe the proposed agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan. Others contend that allowing India access to the international uranium market will free up its domestic uranium sources to make more nuclear weapons. Appendix A contains Frequently Asked Questions about U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation.

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (P.L. 95-242). However, P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive several provisions of the AEA. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress, in addition to other required documents, a written determination that P.L. 109-401's requirements for U.S. nuclear cooperation with India to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law October 8, 2008. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement two days later, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. Additionally, the United States and India signed a subsequent arrangement in July 2010 which governs "arrangements and procedures under which" India may reprocess U.S.-origin nuclear fuel in two new national reprocessing facilities, which New Delhi has not yet constructed. The NSG, at the behest of the Bush Administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention. The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States "intends to support India's full membership" in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes.