Actions To Improve Parts Of The Military Manpower Mobilization System Are Underway

Actions To Improve Parts of the Military Manpower Mobilization System Are Underway

The military manpower system was reviewed. GAO was asked to: (1) examine the assumptions upon which the Department of Defense (DOD) bases its requirements of 650,000 inductees within 180 days; (2) examine the conclusion of the Director of the Selective Service System (SSS) that it can deliver 100,000 inductees by Mobilization (M)+35 days and 650,000 by M+125 days; and (3) determine whether DOD, specifically the Department of the Army, has the training capacity to absorb 100,000 inductees by M+28 days or by M+35 days, and 650,000 inductees by M+125 days. GAO found that: (1) DOD has no documentation or calculations to support the requirement of 650,000 inductees within 180 days of mobilization; (2) the conclusion of the Director of SSS concerning postmobilization registration is optimistic, but to meet the stated timeframes, all events and procedures must work as stated which is highly questionable; and (3) DOD does not have the capability to train the 650,000 people who moved into the services after mobilization. GAO believed the capacity of the training base is at least 360,000 new soldiers by M+180 days. The Army must continue to work on improving the capacity of the training bases, the ability to expand the training force structure, the capability of the training personnel, and the availability of equipment on which to train. The Army also must continue to determine and validate its requirements for trained manpower so that demands levied on SSS can be based on needs and not constrained by limits in the training base capacity.

The military manpower system was reviewed. GAO was asked to: (1) examine the assumptions upon which the Department of Defense (DOD) bases its requirements of 650,000 inductees within 180 days; (2) examine the conclusion of the Director of the Selective Service System (SSS) that it can deliver 100,000 inductees by Mobilization (M)+35 days and 650,000 by M+125 days; and (3) determine whether DOD, specifically the Department of the Army, has the training capacity to absorb 100,000 inductees by M+28 days or by M+35 days, and 650,000 inductees by M+125 days. GAO found that: (1) DOD has no documentation or calculations to support the requirement of 650,000 inductees within 180 days of mobilization; (2) the conclusion of the Director of SSS concerning postmobilization registration is optimistic, but to meet the stated timeframes, all events and procedures must work as stated which is highly questionable; and (3) DOD does not have the capability to train the 650,000 people who moved into the services after mobilization. GAO believed the capacity of the training base is at least 360,000 new soldiers by M+180 days. The Army must continue to work on improving the capacity of the training bases, the ability to expand the training force structure, the capability of the training personnel, and the availability of equipment on which to train. The Army also must continue to determine and validate its requirements for trained manpower so that demands levied on SSS can be based on needs and not constrained by limits in the training base capacity.

Catalog of reports, decisions and opinions, testimonies and speeches.

Contains an inventory of evaluation reports produced by and for selected Federal agencies, including GAO evaluation reports that relate to the programs of those agencies.

Contains an inventory of evaluation reports produced by and for selected Federal agencies, including GAO evaluation reports that relate to the programs of those agencies.

Defense Manpower Planning discusses the important set of national security issues related to defense manpower for the 1980s. The topics in the text focus on the problems of manpower acquisition and retention. The historical background and description of the military power during the 1970s and 1980s are given in detail. A military manpower chronology is provided. The book enumerates some of the manpower issues and debates. Such salient issues as the quantity, quality, socio-economic factors, and the issue of cost, combat effectiveness, and readiness factors are carefully considered. After listing the issues, solutions are then presented. The variants of the all-volunteer force, of conscription, and combining volunteers and conscripts are suggested. A part of the book focuses on active duty forces. The issue of employing women in the military is fully addressed. A description of combat is also tackled. A section of the text explains the relationship between precision guided munitions and the volunteer force. The book will provide useful information to defense military planners, historians, and students of history.