Abandonment Of Defined Benefit Pension Schemes

Pensions and social insurance programs are an integral part of any social protection system. Their dual objectives are to prevent a sharp decline in income and protect against poverty resulting from old age, disability, or death. The critical role of pensions for protection, prevention, and promotion was reiterated and expanded in the new World Bank 2012-2022 social protection strategy. This new strategy reviews the success and challenges of the past decade or more, during which time the World Bank became a main player in the area of pensions. But more importantly, the strategy takes the three key objectives for pensions under the World Bank's conceptual framework coverage, adequacy, and sustainability and asks how these objectives and the inevitable difficult balance between them can best be achieved. The ongoing focus on closing the coverage gap with social pensions and the new outreach to explore the role of matching contributions to address coverage and/or adequacy is part of this strategy. This comprehensive anthology on nonfinancial defined contribution (NDC) pension schemes is part and parcel of the effort to explore and document the working of this new system or reform option and its ability to balance these three key objectives. This innovative, unfunded individual accounts scheme provides a promising option at a time when the world seems locked into a stalemate between piecemeal reform of ailing traditional defined benefit plans or their replacement with prefunded financial account schemes. The current financial crisis, with its focus on sovereign debt, has enhanced the attraction of NDC as a pension scheme that aims for intra and intergenerational fairness, offers a transparent framework to distribute economic and demographic risks, and, if well designed, promises long-term financial stability. Supplemented with a basic minimum pension guarantee, explicit noncontributory rights, and a funded pillar, the NDC approach provides an efficient framework for addressing poverty and risk diversification concerns.

The individual account-based but unfunded approach to mandated public pension systems is a reform benchmark for all pension schemes, promising fair and financially sustainable benefits. Nonfinancial defined contribution (NDC) pension schemes originated in Italy and Sweden in the 1990s, were then adopted by Latvia, Norway, and Poland, envisaged but not implemented in various other countries, such as Egypt and Russia, and remain under discussion in many nations around the world, such as China and France. In its complete form, the approach also comprises budget-financed basic income provisions and mandated or voluntary funded provisions. Volume 1 of this book offers an assessment of countries that were early adopters before addressing key aspects of policy implementation and design review, including how best to combine basic income provisions with an NDC scheme, how to deal with heterogeneity in longevity, and how to adjust NDC scheme design and labor market policies to deliver on reform expectations. Volume 2 addresses a second set of issues, including the gender pension gap and what family policies can do about it within the NDC framework, labor market issues and administrative challenges of NDC schemes and how countries are coping, the role of communication in these pension schemes, the complexity of cross-border pension taxation, and much more. Progress and Challenges of Nonfinancial Defined Contribution Pension Schemes is the third in a series of books analyzing the progress, challenges, and adjustment options of this reform revolution for mandated public pension systems. 'Pension reform is a major issue in many countries. The development of the nonfinancial defined contribution pension plan in the 90's was a major advance in pension design. By reporting actual country experiences and exploring properties of plan designs, this latest collection of essays is a valuable contribution, well worth reading.' Peter Diamond Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 2010 winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 'A highly stimulating publication for policy makers and researchers alike. It pushes the analytical frontier for policy challenges that all public pension schemes are confronted with but that the nonfinancial defined contribution approach promises to handle best.' Noriyuki Takayama President, Research Institute for Policies on Pension and Aging, Tokyo, and professor emeritus, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo 'In a changing world where pensions are more than ever linked to labor markets, communication tools, and flexibility considerations, this anthology provides a unique up-to-date analysis of nonfinancial defined contribution pension schemes. By mixing international experiences and theoretical studies, it demonstrates the high adaptability of such pension schemes to changing social challenges.' Pierre Devolder Professor of Finance and Actuarial Sciences, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium

There has been rapid growth in `self-directed' pension programs such as the 401(k) plan. Because such plans are voluntary, there is concern that many workers neglecting to contribute will reach retirement with inadequate pension saving. First, we show that people who are eligible for 401(k)s, do not contribute to them, and have no alternative pension plan make up only 2-4 percent of the workforce. By contrast, nearly 50 percent of workers have no pension coverage at all. Imposing mandatory 3 percent or 5 percent contribution rates will improve retirement prospects among the lowest decile of pension- eligible, but would have small aggregate effects. Finally, restricting 401(k) withdrawals when the worker changes jobs could have a larger impact on retirement pension security.

Public pension and labor union funds have been the driving force in diversified shareholder activism. They have also fended off attacks on jobs and proactively created jobs for fund contributors. These funds currently represent almost $4 trillion in assets over which workers have substantial control. That worker control - and the collective nature of defined benefit pension plans - is the necessary precondition for their shareholder activism. Both worker control and collective investment are directly threatened by the rise of defined contribution funds, particularly by well-funded efforts to promote the 401(k) in the public sector, the last bastion of the traditional pension plan (unlike traditional pensions, defined contribution funds do not guarantee fixed payments to retirees). Due to a purported nationwide underfunding crisis for public pensions in particular - a crisis whose scale, scope and even existence is contested by economists and actuaries - many states and cities have wholly or partly abandoned, or are contemplating abandoning, collectively managed defined benefit pension plans in favor of 401(k) plans that are outsources to existing private mutual funds. Far more than legal reforms, like changing shareholder voting thresholds or the prospect of mandatory arbitration provisions, these reforms pose an existential threat to the ability of workers to wield the collective shareholder voice they now wield via defined benefit pension plans.This Article does not concede that traditional pensions should be reformed out of existence. There are excellent reasons to defend them, and excellent reasons to attack defined contribution funds. That said, to the extent that traditional pensions continue to be reformed out of existence, this Article illustrates that there are defined contribution alternatives to the 401(k) that would still preserve collective shareholder voice. This Article sketches out examples of defined contribution funds that could restore shareholder voice which the transition from defined benefit to 401(k) plans has stripped away, and could preserve that voice in jurisdictions that have not yet taken action.

Modern corporate bankruptcy law has been shaped, and some of it written, by special interests. Even so, the law is rooted in American ideals of renewal, and of viewing failure in the marketplace as a sign of effort and gumption, not moral collapse. It's a powerful idea - shedding the past to begin anew. But for decades, Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code has also been used strategically - to destroy union contracts, edge out competitors, and limit product liability lawsuits.More recently, some private equity firms have honed Chapter 11 as an efficient financial engineering tool for insider sales - and for dumping pensions. Based on partial data from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., at least 51 companies have abandoned pension plans in bankruptcy at the behest of private equity firms since 2001. They've dumped $1.592 billion in pension bills onto a government-backed agency that insures private defined benefit plans. Because pension insurance doesn't cover all benefits, their actions have left some of the nearly 102,000 workers or retirees with lost benefits amounting to at least $128 million. And they've contributed to the chronic deficits at the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.Other types of businesses, including publicly held companies, have also abandoned pension plans in bankruptcy. But the business model and practices of some private equity firms can make pension-dumping in bankruptcy especially attractive.The legal and regulatory environments in the U.S. combine with those practices to add up to a form of institutional corruption. In this working paper, I explain how Oliver Wendell Holmes' hypothetical “bad man” can use bankruptcy as a strategy to profit. So, here is a bad man's guide to ditching pensions in bankruptcy - legally.

Why has old-age security become less solidaristic and increasingly tied to risky capitalist markets? Drawing on rich archival data that covers more than fifty years of American history, Michael A. McCarthy argues that the critical driver was policymakers' reactions to capitalist crises and their political imperative to promote capitalist growth.Pension development has followed three paths of marketization in America since the New Deal, each distinct but converging: occupational pension plans were adopted as an alternative to real increases in Social Security benefits after World War II, private pension assets were then financialized and invested into the stock market, and, since the 1970s, traditional pension plans have come to be replaced with riskier 401(k) retirement plans. Comparing each episode of change, Dismantling Solidarity mounts a forceful challenge to common understandings of America’s private pension system and offers an alternative political economy of the welfare state. McCarthy weaves together a theoretical framework that helps to explain pension marketization with structural mechanisms that push policymakers to intervene to promote capitalist growth and avoid capitalist crises and contingent historical factors that both drive them to intervene in the particular ways they do and shape how their interventions bear on welfare change. By emphasizing the capitalist context in which policymaking occurs, McCarthy turns our attention to the structural factors that drive policy change. Dismantling Solidarity is both theoretically and historically detailed and superbly argued, urging the reader to reconsider how capitalism itself constrains policymaking. It will be of interest to sociologists, political scientists, historians, and those curious about the relationship between capitalism and democracy.