A Special Force Origin And Development Of The Jedburgh Project In Support Of Operation Overload

This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission. The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort. These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today’s UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.

This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission. The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort. These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today's UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.

This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission. The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort. These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today's UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future wars.

Spies and Saboteurs is the story of the origins of the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' in human intelligence collection and special operations, which took place amidst the global conflagration that was the Second World War. It is the story of William 'Wild Bill' Donovan - the father of America's Central Intelligence Agency - and of his relationship with legendary British spymasters like William Stephenson, code named 'Intrepid', Stewart Menzies ('C'), chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Admiral John Godfrey, the powerful and enigmatic director of Naval Intelligence, and General Colin Gubbins, Britain's master saboteur. Relying almost exclusively upon recently declassified OSS and British intelligence documents and survivor interviews, it examines the transatlantic association in espionage and sabotage, guerrilla warfare and disinformation. It explores the evolution of covert relations from a 'tutorial' arrangement with the U.S. as pupil, to an unequal then full partnership, and ultimately to competition and rivalry in the prosecution of the clandestine war.

A thrilling account of one of the most important covert operations of World War II In 1943, less than a year before D-Day, nearly three hundred American, British, and French soldiers—shadow warriors—parachuted deep behind enemy lines in France as part of the covert Operation Jedburgh. Working with the beleaguered French Resistance, the "Jeds" launched a stunningly effective guerrilla campaign against the Germans in preparation for the Normandy invasion. Colin Beavan, whose grandfather helped direct Operation Jedburgh for the Office of Strategic Services, draws on scores of interviews with the surviving Jeds and their families to tell the thrilling story of the rowdy daredevils who carried out America's first specialforces missions—forever changing the way Americans wage war.

Eisenhower's guerillas' tells the story of the reconnaissance and intelligence teams of young Special Forces, called Jedburghs, who worked behind enemy lines to strengthen the Allies' position in Northern France.0Their task of organizing and training the French operatives, already monumental, was made more difficult by the fact that France's war aims were profoundly different from those of America and Britain, who regarded France as merely a military objective on the way to defeating Germany. Ben Jones describes how Eisenhower learned how to exploit this political turmoil to his advantage, and explores how the Allied Jedburgh teams still managed to coordinate French guerrilla operations within the overall plans for the country's liberation.

The array of new technologies that came on the scene in the early 20th century resulted in widely varied new forms of military special operations once civilization embarked on its greatest war. Suddenly, fighting men could be delivered by parachute, submarine, glider, jeeps, and fast amphibious craft deep into enemy territory to perform special tasks; yet others would continue to perform missions the same as their ancestors in previous wars—on foot using stealth, endurance and patience. This work contains discussions of the employment of various special purpose, special mission organizations during World War II. These units operated in Allied and Axis countries and in various theaters of war including Europe, North Africa, the Pacific, Asia, and the continental United States. Representing every major combatant, the operations include various kinds of raids, intelligence gathering missions, support to partisan/guerrilla groups, prisoner rescues, direct-action missions, and at least two where the object was simply to steal something. Some missions would have been officially denied if the operations had been caught in the act. The book is divided into two sections: Behind Enemy Lines and Behind Friendly Lines, to demonstrate that special-purpose organizations can be employed wherever needed, even in areas controlled by military units of their own or allied countries. Many of the units described run the gamut of special mission types, from commando to parachute units, reconnaissance to sabotage units, and partisan training units as well as those with combined missions. Many of the operations described in this book continue to serve as templates for modern Special Operations missions, while still others—the first attempts of their kind—continue to serve as examples of what not to try under the circumstances. Michael F. Dilley served for 20 years in the U.S. Army’s Military Intelligence branch. After retiring from the Army, the author served for about ten years as an employee of the Department of Defense, then as a contractor for various U.S. Government agencies in several fields for 15 years. Author of several books and many articles, a number of these chapters are based on his previous writings for the legendary Behind the Lines magazine.

This book tells, for the first time, the story of their recuitment and training and their courageous actions alongside the Dutch Resistance.

Spies, Supplies and Moonlit Skies, Volume II: The French Connection, April-June 1944: Code Name Neptune During the critical period of World War II leading up to D-Day the United States Army Air Forces activated the first Air Special Operations Group for clandestine activity against the Nazi enemy in Occupied Europe. While the daylight Bombardment and Fighter Groups of the Army Air Forces cleared the skies of Nazi planes in a brutal war of attrition before the invasion, the 801st Bombardment Group, on night operations from their secret base near Harrington in the United Kingdom dropped supplies and agents to the Resistance forces of Europe in preparation for D-Day on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944. This is their story. A brief comment from a well-known author of 8th Air Force History, received on 17/02/2005 via email: Dear Thomas Ensminger, Yesterday I was surprised and delighted to receive the copy of your Volume II. What an amazingly comprehensive work this is, and it obviously took a great effort and much time to produce. It certainly is THE reference for Carpetbagger activities and finds a welcome place on my library shelves. Congratulations to you and your team for this superb contribution to the history of the Second World War and the sterling work of the Carpetbaggers. Sincere thanks, Roger A. Freeman 8th Air Force Historian