A Small War In The Balkans

This book is the story of the British military involvement in Yugoslavia in the Second World War.

In 1912, the Balkan states formed an alliance in an effort to break free from the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Forming an army of some 645,000 troops from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenego, they took on a force of 400,000 Turkish soldiers. Both sides were equipped with the latest weapons technology. This book looks at the diverse and sometimes colourful uniforms worn by both sides, paying special attention to insignia, weapons and equipment. It also gives an overview of the campaigns that became a 'priming pan' of World War I.

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" Yugoslavia was well positioned at the end of the cold war to make a successful transition to a market economy and westernization. Yet two years later, the country had ceased to exist, and devastating local wars were being waged to create new states. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992, the country moved toward disintegration at astonishing speed. The collapse of Yugoslavia into nationalist regimes led not only to horrendous cruelty and destruction, but also to a crisis of Western security regimes. Coming at the height of euphoria over the end of the cold war and the promise of a ""new world order,"" the conflict presented Western governments and the international community with an unwelcome and unexpected set of tasks. Their initial assessment that the conflict was of little strategic significance or national interest could not be sustained in light of its consequences. By 1994 the conflict had emerged as the most challenging threat to existing norms and institutions that Western leaders faced. And by the end of 1994, more than three years after the international community explicitly intervened to mediate the conflict, there had been no progress on any of the issues raised by the country's dissolution. In this book, Susan Woodward explains what happened to Yugoslavia and what can be learned from the response of outsiders to its crisis. She argues that focusing on ancient ethnic hatreds and military aggression was a way to avoid the problem and misunderstood nationalism in post-communist states. The real origin of the Yugoslav conflict, Woodward explains, is the disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of a political and civil order, a process that occurred over a prolonged period. The Yugoslav conflict is inseparable from international change and interdependence, and it is not confined to the Balkans but is part of a more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration. Woodward's analysis is based on her first-hand experience before the country's collapse and then during the later stages of the Bosnian war as a member of the UN operation sent to monitor cease-fires and provide humanitarian assistance. She argues that Western action not only failed to prevent the spread of violence or to negotiate peace, but actually exacerbated the conflict. Woodward attempts to explain why these challenges will not cease or the Yugoslav conflicts end until the actual causes of the conflict, the goals of combatants, and the fundamental issues they pose for international order are better understood and addressed. "

The almost-forgotten story of the 1912-13 Balkan Wars that became the precursor to First World War

From the PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION of 1915. We republish this little book because it has been found by experience to meet a widely-felt need, and to meet it in a compendious form. The dangers against which we uttered so strong a warning have unfortunately been realized: Bulgaria has joined our enemies. As a result, some paragraphs will be found to be out of date. But we have thought it best to leave the whole book unchanged, except that the chapter which deals with the diplomatic methods of the moment is now relegated to an appendix. Nothing has happened to disprove our contention that these methods would have succeeded at the time when they were proposed, and though in the Near East it is the unexpected that happens, the time may come when they will be once more in place. The book in its original form was, and is, a connected whole. It sets forth certain principles and a certain ideal, which have by no means lost their importance. The immediate prospect is obscure, but, to those who look to the ultimate settlement, the complications of the moment represent a movement of the surface rather than of the depths beneath. There are factors in Balkan policy which are fundamental because they are rooted in conditions which do not alter. It was upon these factors that the policy set forth in this book was founded. The first arises from the geographical position of the Balkans, which has made them the battleground for the rivalry of the great neighboring empires -- a rivalry which found material to work upon in the mutual hatred caused by unjust frontiers. It follows from this that so long as such rivalry continues, it is to the real and permanent advantage of every Balkan State, without exception, to look for support to the disinterested Powers of the West. The second factor arises from the distribution of Balkan nationalities. "Room must be found and kept," to use Mr. Asquith's words, " for the independent existence and free development of the small nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its own." Any rearrangement which fails to take this consideration into account will leave behind it the seeds of future war. Others will doubtless be urged at the time of settlement -- Economic and strategic needs, the idea of a Balkan equilibrium or balance of power, and the desirability of rewarding or punishing particular States. But it cannot be too often insisted that peace will not be secured unless, broadly speaking, the lines of nationality are accepted as the basis for the new frontiers. The degree in which this ideal may be attainable is, of course, a matter of uncertainty. But real statesmanship will bear it in mind, and approach as near to it as circumstances allow.

The author writes about his experience during World War I, and the human beings he encountered in the countries of Eastern Europe from April to October, 1915.