A Mathematical Theory Of Arguments For Statistical Evidence

The subject of this book is the reasoning under uncertainty based on sta tistical evidence, where the word reasoning is taken to mean searching for arguments in favor or against particular hypotheses of interest. The kind of reasoning we are using is composed of two aspects. The first one is inspired from classical reasoning in formal logic, where deductions are made from a knowledge base of observed facts and formulas representing the domain spe cific knowledge. In this book, the facts are the statistical observations and the general knowledge is represented by an instance of a special kind of sta tistical models called functional models. The second aspect deals with the uncertainty under which the formal reasoning takes place. For this aspect, the theory of hints [27] is the appropriate tool. Basically, we assume that some uncertain perturbation takes a specific value and then logically eval uate the consequences of this assumption. The original uncertainty about the perturbation is then transferred to the consequences of the assumption. This kind of reasoning is called assumption-based reasoning. Before going into more details about the content of this book, it might be interesting to look briefly at the roots and origins of assumption-based reasoning in the statistical context. In 1930, R. A. Fisher [17] defined the notion of fiducial distribution as the result of a new form of argument, as opposed to the result of the older Bayesian argument.

Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability. Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.

An approach to the modeling of and the reasoning under uncertainty. The book develops the Dempster-Shafer Theory with regard to the reliability of reasoning with uncertain arguments. Of particular interest here is the development of a new synthesis and the integration of logic and probability theory. The reader benefits from a new approach to uncertainty modeling which extends classical probability theory.

In this illuminating volume, Robert P. Abelson delves into the too-often dismissed problems of interpreting quantitative data and then presenting them in the context of a coherent story about one's research. Unlike too many books on statistics, this is a remarkably engaging read, filled with fascinating real-life (and real-research) examples rather than with recipes for analysis. It will be of true interest and lasting value to beginning graduate students and seasoned researchers alike. The focus of the book is that the purpose of statistics is to organize a useful argument from quantitative evidence, using a form of principled rhetoric. Five criteria, described by the acronym MAGIC (magnitude, articulation, generality, interestingness, and credibility) are proposed as crucial features of a persuasive, principled argument. Particular statistical methods are discussed, with minimum use of formulas and heavy data sets. The ideas throughout the book revolve around elementary probability theory, t tests, and simple issues of research design. It is therefore assumed that the reader has already had some access to elementary statistics. Many examples are included to explain the connection of statistics to substantive claims about real phenomena.

An approach to the modeling of and the reasoning under uncertainty. The book develops the Dempster-Shafer Theory with regard to the reliability of reasoning with uncertain arguments. Of particular interest here is the development of a new synthesis and the integration of logic and probability theory. The reader benefits from a new approach to uncertainty modeling which extends classical probability theory.

This selection of articles emerged from different works presented "The Art of Semiparametrics" conference in 2003 in Berlin. It offers a collection of individual works that together show the large spectrum of semiparametric statistics. The book combines theoretical contributions with more applied and empirical studies. Although each article represents an original contribution to its own field, all are written in a self-contained way that may be read by non-experts.

This book presents the scientific outcome of a joint effort of the computer science departments of the universities of Berne, Fribourg and Neuchâtel. Within an initiative devoted to "Information and Knowledge", these research groups collaborated over several years on issues of logic, probability, inference, and deduction. The goal of this volume is to examine whether there is any common ground between the different approaches to the concept of information. The structure of this book could be represented by a circular model, with an innermost syntactical circle, comprising statistical and algorithmic approaches; a second, larger circle, the semantical one, in which "meaning" enters the stage; and finally an outermost circle, the pragmatic one, casting light on real-life logical reasoning. These articles are complemented by two philosophical contributions exploring the wide conceptual field as well as taking stock of the articles on the various formal theories of information.

This lively collection of essays examines in witty detail the history of some of the concepts involved in bringing statistical argument "to the table," and some of the pitfalls that have been encountered. The topics range from seventeenth-century medicine and the circulation of blood, to the cause of the Great Depression and the effect of the California gold discoveries of 1848 upon price levels, to the determinations of the shape of the Earth and the speed of light, to the meter of Virgil's poetry and the prediction of the Second Coming of Christ. The title essay tells how the statistician Karl Pearson came to issue the challenge to put "statistics on the table" to the economists Marshall, Keynes, and Pigou in 1911. The 1911 dispute involved the effect of parental alcoholism upon children, but the challenge is general and timeless: important arguments require evidence, and quantitative evidence requires statistical evaluation. Some essays examine deep and subtle statistical ideas such as the aggregation and regression paradoxes; others tell of the origin of the Average Man and the evaluation of fingerprints as a forerunner of the use of DNA in forensic science. Several of the essays are entirely nontechnical; all examine statistical ideas with an ironic eye for their essence and what their history can tell us about current disputes.