A History Of The Blcokade Of Germany And Of The Countries Associated With Her In The Great War Austria Hungary Bulgaria And Turkey

Many historians attribute the seemingly sudden collapse of Germany and her Central Powers allies in 1918, not to defeats on the battlefields of the western front, but to the disastrous cumulative effects of the British blockade of Germany's ports and coastline. This massive volume - kept strictly secret until as recently as 1960 - is the official history of the blockade that brought the Kaiser's proud Reich to its knees. Germany, hoping to knock out France and end the war in weeks, was ill prepared for a long conflict in which economic factors would come to play a decisive role. Totally dependent on the import of food and raw materials, Germany was supremely vulnerable to the Royal Navy choking off its lifelines. After the Battle of Jutland in 1916 had confined Germany's High Seas Fleet to port, the tightening blockade became ever more effective, progressively causing the regulation of food prices, rationing, and finally the dreadful 'Turnip Winter' of 1917 in which its hungry population was reduced to eating the eponymous vegetable, and brewing ersatz coffee from acorns. 750,000 Germans starved to death, and the collapse in civilian morale led to social revolution, mutinies in the Fleet and Army, and finally to Germany sueing for armistice terms.As we mark the centenary of the war, this previously restricted and hugely detailed record is of crucial importance to our understanding one of of the vital factors that finally brought Allied victory.

This book explores the development of the global economy in the twentieth century through the lens of the European maritime infrastructure.

To Arms is Hew Strachan's most complete and definitive study of the opening of the First World War. Now, key sections from this magisterial work are published as individual paperbacks, each complete in itself, and with a new introduction by the author.The First World War was not just fought in the trenches of the western front. It embraced all of Africa. Many of those who fought this white man's war were black. The dangers they confronted went beyond those of the battlefield. They fell prey to malaria and dysentery, and they were attacked by lions and crocodiles. But it was a vast and spectacular theatre of operations, in which great personalities - thrusting German officers like Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, or big-game hunters like PeterPretorious - could impose themselves. Embracing the perspectives of all the nations who fought there, this is the first ever full account of the Great War in Africa.

With so much at stake and so much already lost, why did World War I end with a whimper-an arrangement between two weary opponents to suspend hostilities? After more than four years of desperate fighting, with victories sometimes measured in feet and inches, why did the Allies reject the option of advancing into Germany in 1918 and taking Berlin? Most histories of the Great War focus on the avoidability of its beginning. This book brings a laser-like focus to its ominous end-the Allies' incomplete victory, and the tragic ramifications for world peace just two decades later. In the most comprehensive account to date of the conflict's endgame, David Stevenson approaches the events of 1918 from a truly international perspective, examining the positions and perspectives of combatants on both sides, as well as the impact of the Russian Revolution. Stevenson pays close attention to America's effort in its first twentieth-century war, including its naval and military contribution, army recruitment, industrial mobilization, and home-front politics. Alongside military and political developments, he adds new information about the crucial role of economics and logistics. The Allies' eventual success, Stevenson shows, was due to new organizational methods of managing men and materiel and to increased combat effectiveness resulting partly from technological innovation. These factors, combined with Germany's disastrous military offensive in spring 1918, ensured an Allied victory-but not a conclusive German defeat.

The essays in this collection, the fourth in a series on the problem of total war, examine the inter-war period.