A Critical Assessment Of The Role Of Directors In Relation To Takeovers Of Public Companies

Essay from the year 2019 in the subject Law - Civil / Private, Trade, Anti Trust Law, Business Law, grade: A, University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh Law School), course: Company Law, language: English, abstract: Target directors have an ambiguous role in corporate takeovers. On the one hand, once a bid is imminent, they are significantly involved spending most of their time in responding to the bid and advising the shareholders whose interests the directors must primarily represent. On the other hand, they face various potential conflicts of interests as takeovers can have significant personal and professional implications on them. This essay critically assesses the role of directors in relation to takeovers of public companies. Their corporate powers are constrained by a range of rules in the Takeover Code . However, takeover regulation leaves significant room for board discretion which is therefore subject to common law and general company law. As we will see, the target directors only have an advisory role vis-à-vis the shareholders, with the latter taking the ultimate decision on acceptance of the takeover bid. The essay is structured as follows. Section 2 starts by introducing the context of takeovers of public companies followed by a brief summary of common motives for takeovers in section 3. Special emphasis is placed on the effects of the theory of the market for control on directors which at various points had an influence on the takeover regulation. Section 4 then deals with the allocation of the acceptance-decision on a takeover bid to the shareholders. In order not to interfere with this right by taking defensive measures which could frustrate a takeover bid, the Takeover Code has imposed a strict ‘no frustration rule’ on target directors. This is covered by section 5. Reference will also be made to the respective directors’ (fiduciary) duties under common law and company law. Subsequently, section 6 critically discusses the advisory role of the target directors when recommending a takeover offer to the shareholders, the various conflicts of interest to which they are exposed and how the takeover regulations attempt to solve them. Although the takeover regime mainly focuses on the role of target directors, section 7 outlines some of the constraints which the directors of the bidder are subject to when launching a takeover bid. Section 8 concludes.

Essay from the year 2018 in the subject Business economics - General, grade: A, University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh Law School), course: Corporation Law and Economics, language: English, abstract: This essay examines the question whether allowing directors to implement anti-takeover defences is beneficial for all corporate constituencies. Beginning with the classification of the topic in the law and economics context of the market for corporate control in Chapter 2, I will briefly outline in Chapter 3 the scenarios in which anti-takeover defences usually come into operation, namely hostile takeovers. Chapter 4 presents the most common anti-takeover defences and sets out the legal framework to what extent directors are permitted to adopt such defences in accordance with the applicable law. A distinction is made between UK and US law, with the latter focussing on Delaware law, where more than a half of all US publicly traded corporations are established. The Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court have developed an extraordinary body of jurisprudence concerning corporate takeovers and anti-takeover defences. Chapter 5 points out potential impacts on the various constituencies of a company and deals with the fact why their interests have to be regarded in the takeover context. Finally, Chapter 6 critically evaluates anti-takeover defences from different stakeholder perspectives and concludes that these are not beneficial for all corporate constituencies, but for directors only.

This book examines the legal duties of Directors Of Public Companies in the light of the stakeholder approach to the firm. It considers the theory that directors are not simply agents of corporate shareholders,but have a duty to take into consideration and, where appropriate, balance the interests of several constituencies, each of which has a legitimate stake in the company, its activities and its development. This book is essentially the first to relate the stakeholding arguments and Third Way politics, as popularised by commentators such as Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens, to the prospects for reform of company law in an authoritative but accessible format. It is an ideal text for company law, business and politics students, both undergraduate and postgraduate, and will also provide companies with a straightforward and welcome guide to this often complex area, particularly to the important issues of accountability and regulation.

The corporate governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States are often characterized as a single 'Anglo-American' system prioritizing shareholders' interests over those of other corporate stakeholders. Such generalizations, however, obscure substantial differences across the common-law world. Contrary to popular belief, shareholders in the United Kingdom and jurisdictions following its lead are far more powerful and central to the aims of the corporation than are shareholders in the United States. This book presents a new comparative theory to explain this divergence and explores the theory's ramifications for law and public policy. Bruner argues that regulatory structures affecting other stakeholders' interests - notably differing degrees of social welfare protection for employees - have decisively impacted the degree of political opposition to shareholder-centric policies across the common-law world. These dynamics remain powerful forces today, and understanding them will be vital as post-crisis reforms continue to take shape.

With acquisition activity running into the trillions of dollars, it continues to be a favorite for corporate growth strategy, but creating shareholder value remains the most elusive outcome of these corporate strategies—after decades of research and billions of dollars paid in advisory fees, why do these major decisions continue to destroy value? Building on his groundbreaking research first cited in Business Week, Mark L. Sirower explains how companies often pay too much—and predictably never realize the promises of increased performance and competitiveness—in their quest to acquire other companies. Armed with extensive evidence, Sirower destroys the popular notion that the acquisition premium represents potential value. He provides the first formal and functional definition for synergy -- the specific increases in performance beyond those already expected for companies to achieve independently. Sirower's refreshing nuts-and-bolts analysis of the fundamentals behind acquisition performance cuts sharply through the existing folklore surrounding failed acquisitions, such as lack of "strategic fit" or corporate culture problems, and gives managers the tools to avoid predictable losses in acquisition decisions. Using several detailed examples of recent major acquisitions and through his masterful integration and extension of techniques from finance and business strategy, Sirower reveals: -The unique business gamble that acquisitions represent -The managerial challenges already embedded in current stock prices -The competitive conditions that must be met and the organizational cornerstones that must be in place for any possibility of synergy -The precise Required Performance Improvements (RPIs) implicitly embedded in acquisition premiums and the reasons why these RPIs normally dwarf realistic performance gains -The seductiveness and danger of sophisticated valuation models so often used by advisers The Synergy Trap is the first exposé of its kind to prove that the tendency of managers to succumb to the "up the ante" philosophy in acquisitions often leads to disastrous ends for their shareholders. Sirower shows that companies must meticulously plan—and account for huge uncertainties—before deciding to enter the acquisition game. To date, Sirower's work is the most comprehensive and rigorous, yet practical, analysis of the drivers of acquisition performance. This definitive book will become required reading for managers, corporate directors, consultants, investors, bankers, and academics involved in the mergers and acquisitions arena.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks and federal savings associations (collectively, banks), as well as federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. In regulating banks, the OCC has the power to:* examine the banks.* approve or deny applications for new charters, branches, capital, or otherchanges in corporate or banking structure.* take supervisory actions against banks that do not comply with lawsand regulations or that otherwise engage in unsafe or unsound practices.The OCC also can remove officers and directors, negotiate agreementsto change banking practices, and issue cease-and-desist (C&D) orders aswell as civil money penalties (CMP).* issue rules and regulations, legal interpretations, and corporate decisionsgoverning investments, lending, and other activities.Boards of directors play critical roles in the successful operation of banks. The OCC recognizes the challenges facing bank directors. The Director's Book: Role of Directors for National Banks and Federal Savings Associations helps directors fulfill their responsibilities in a prudent manner. This book provides an overview of the OCC, outlines directors' responsibilities as well as management's role, explains basic concepts and standards for safe and sound operation of banks, and delineates laws and regulations that apply to banks. To better understand a particular bank activity and its associated risks, directors should refer to the Comptroller's Handbook booklets, including the "Corporate and Risk Governance" booklet. For information generally found in board reports, including "red flags"--ratios or trends that may signal existing or potential problems--directors should refer to Detecting Red Flags in Board Reports: A Guide for Directors..

Two strengths distinguish this textbook from others. One is its presentation of subjects in the contexts wherein they occur. The other is its use of current events. Other improvements have shortened and simplified chapters, increased the numbers and types of pedagogical supplements, and expanded the international appeal of examples.