A Comparative History Of Central Bank Behavior

It is widely believed that central banks have grown (the Bank of England) or were established (the Federal Reserve) to pursue the twin objectives of monetary and price stability. But why should they? Central bankers are people, too, whose behavior is presumably determined, like the rest of us, by their incentives and the information available to them. The author explores this question.

Central banks in Great Britain and the United States arose early in the financial revolution. The Bank of England was created in 1694 while the first Banks of the United States appeared in 1791-1811 and 1816-36, and were followed by the Idependent Treasury, 1846-1914. These institutions, together with the Suffolk Bank and the New York Clearing House, exercised important central banking function before the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Significant monetary changes in the lives of these British and American institutions are examined within a framework that deals with the knowledge and behavior of central bankers and their interactions with economists and politicians. Central Bankers' behavior has shown considerable continuity in the influence of incentives and their interest in the stability of the financial markets. For example, the Federal Reserve's behavior during the Great Depression, the low inflation of the 1990s, and its resurgence the next decade follow from its structure and from government pressures rather than accidents of personnel.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

Central banks have emerged as the key players in national and international policy making. This book explores their evolution since World War II in 20 industrial countries. The study considers the mix of economic, political and institutional forces that have affected central bank behaviour and its relationship with government. The analysis reconciles vastly different views about the role of central banks in the making of economic policies. One finding is that monetary policy is an evolutionary process.

This volume collects the proceedings from a conference on the evolution and practice of central banking sponsored by the Central Bank Institute of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The articles and discussants' comments in this volume largely focus on two questions: the need for central banks, and how to maintain price stability once they are established. The questions addressed include whether large banks (or coalitions of small banks) can substitute for government regulation and due central bank liquidity provision; whether the future will have fewer central banks or more; the possibility of private means to deliver a uniform currency; if competition across sovereign currencies can ensure global price stability; the role of learning (and unlearning) the lessons of the past inflationary episodes in understanding central bank behavior; and an analysis of the European Central Bank.

The twentieth century has seen the rise of modern central banking. At its close, it is also witnessing the first steps in the decline of the role of some of the most famous of these institutions. In this volume, some of the world’s best known specialists examine the process whereby central banks emerged and asserted themselves within the economic and political spheres of their respective countries. Although the theory and the political economy that presided over their creation did not show great divergence across borders, a considerable institutional variety was nevertheless the result. Among the many factors responsible for this diversity, attention is drawn here not only to the idiosyncrasies of domestic financial systems and to the occurrence of political shocks with major monetary repercussions, such as wars, but also to the peculiarities of each economy and of the political and social climate reigning at the time when central banks were created or formalized. The twelve essays cover European, Asian and American experiences and many of them use a comparative approach.

The Evolution of Central Banks employs a wide range of historical evidence and reassesses current monetary analysis to argue that the development of non-profit-maximizing and noncompetitive central banks to supervise and regulate the commercial banking system fulfils a necessary and natural function. Goodhart surveys the case for free banking, examines the key role of the clearing house in the evolution of the central bank, and investigates bank expansion and fluctuation in the context of the clearing house mechanism. He concludes that it is the noncompetitive aspect of the central bank that is crucial to the performance of its role. Goodhart addresses the questions of deposit insurance and takes up the "club theory" approach to the central bank. Included in the historical study of their origins are 8 European central banks, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.

The respective legal frameworks that control central banks are shaped by whether they are market oriented or government controlled. However such stark distinction between these two categories has been challenged in view of the varying styles of crisis management demonstrated by different central banks during the crisis. This book uses comparative analysis to investigate how the global financial crisis challenged the role played by central banks in maintaining financial stability. Focusing on four central banks including the US Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the People's Bank of China, it illustrates the similarities between the banks prior to the crisis, and their similar policy responses in the wake of the crisis. It demonstrates how each operated with varying levels of independence while performing very differently and facing different tasks. The book identifies some central explanatory variables for this behavior, addressing the mismatch of similar risk management solutions and varying outcomes. Central Bank Regulation and The Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis explores the legal challenges within central bank regulation presented by the global financial crisis. It emphasizes the importance of, and the limitations involved in, legal order and argue that in spite of integration and globalization, significant differences exist in central banks' approaches to risk management and financial stability.

"The Handbook reflects the state of the art in the theory and practice of central banking. It covers all the essential areas that have come under scrutiny since the global financial crisis of 2007-9"--

Alan S. Blinder offers the dual perspective of a leading academic macroeconomist who served a stint as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board—one who practiced what he had long preached and then returned to academia to write about it. He tells central bankers how they might better incorporate academic knowledge and thinking into the conduct of monetary policy, and he tells scholars how they might reorient their research to be more attuned to reality and thus more useful to central bankers. Based on the 1996 Lionel Robbins Lectures, this readable book deals succinctly, in a nontechnical manner, with a wide variety of issues in monetary policy. The book also includes the author's suggested solution to an age-old problem in monetary theory: what it means for monetary policy to be "neutral."